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Secession in International Law and Relations:
What Are We Talking About?
GLEN ANDERSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War scholars have devoted increasing
attention to the process of state creation known as “secession.” Exactly
what the concept of secession entails, however, is still very much a
moot point. The concept remains undefined by treaty law and United
Nations (UN) declaratory General Assembly resolutions. Indeed the
word “secession” is conspicuously absent from virtually all
1
international legal instruments. This situation is explicable by the fact
that secession represents a challenge to perhaps the two most
fundamental principles of international law: the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of states. Secession is thus viewed negatively and is

 Dr. Glen Anderson is a Lecturer in law at Newcastle University Australia and has previously
been employed at the School of Law Macquarie University Australia. He has also published on
unilateral non-colonial secession in the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy and the
Connecticut Journal of International Law.
1. With the exception of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and
Interference in the Internal Affairs of States (G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/36/103 (Vol. X), at 80 (Dec. 9 1981)), which in Article 2(II)(f) proclaims “[t]he duty
of . . . State[s] to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of
rebellious or secessionist activities within other States under any pretext whatsoever, or any
action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of other
States.” Of course secession in a non-colonial context is widely believed to be implicitly
mentioned within Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter
of the United Nations (G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A (Oct. 24 1970)), which provides
that “[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to
race creed or colour.” The same text is repeated, mutatis mutandis, in Article 1 of the Declaration
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations (G.A. Res. 50/6, U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/6, at 1 (Oct. 24, 1995)). If it is accepted that the word
“secession” also encompasses decolonization—as this article propounds infra−then other
instruments might also be considered as implicitly touching upon colonial secession, principal
among which is the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/15 (Dec. 14, 1960).
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associated with chaos, schism, fragmentation, and instability. So strong
is the sentiment against secession that former UN Secretary-General, U
Thant, contended in 1970 that the international organization “has never
accepted and does not accept and I do not believe will ever accept the
3
principle of secession of part of its Member State[s].”
With the lack of a legal definition of secession, various scholars
have attempted to define the concept. Some scholars, it would seem, are
determined to minimize the scope of secession, circumscribing their
4
definitions to only the most exacting circumstances. Others adopt broad
5
definitions that encompass a wide range of circumstances. In any event,
virtually all scholarly definitions fail to enumerate any reasoning to
6
justify their inclusion or exclusion of certain definitional elements.
The present article aims to address this deficiency by examining
the etymological and conceptual bases of secession. Significantly, it
also combines this examination with recourse to international law. The
article thus produces a definition of secession that is informed
etymologically, conceptually and legally. It is submitted that this mixed
approach is desirable for two reasons: first, secession is, prima facie, a
concept of generic application and meaning, and thus, any definition of
secession in any specific context must account for etymological and
conceptual foundations; and second, given that the present article is
focused specifically on secession in the context of international law and
relations, any comprehensive definition relating thereto must account
for relevant international legal principles.
II. DEFINITION OF SECESSION
On the basis of the forthcoming analysis, the present article defines
secession in the context of international law and relations as: The
withdrawal of territory (colonial or non-colonial) from part of an
existing state to create a new state.
2. Bertus de Villiers, Secession – The Last Resort for Minority Protection, J. OF ASIAN &
AFR. STUDIES 1 (2012).
3. Secretary-General’s Press Conferences, 7 UN Monthly Chron. 35, 36 (1970).
4. Here the definitions provided by Heraclides and Crawford are apposite. See generally
ALEXIS HERACLIDES, THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1
(1991); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 375 (2d
ed. 2006) [hereinafter CRAWFORD].
5. Here the definitions Buchanan and Raič are apposite. See Allen Buchanan, “Secession,”
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHIL.
(Feb.
24,
2013),
available
at
STAN.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/secession; DAVID RAIČ, STATEHOOD AND THE LAW OF SELFDETERMINATION 308 (2002).
6. Radan’s work is a notable exception. See Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan,
Secession: A Word in Search of a Meaning, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND
GLOBALISATION 17–32 (Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan eds., 2008); Aleksandar Pavković
& Peter Radan, CREATING NEW STATES: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SECESSION 5–30 (2007).
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The foregoing definition includes and excludes a number of
distinct elements, some of which may not be immediately obvious.
First, it suggests, in a conceptual sense, that secession is synonymous
with withdrawal; second, it captures consensual and unilateral
secession; third, it excludes irredentism, which does not involve the
creation of a new state, but rather the amalgamation of an existing
state’s territory, in whole or part, with another existing state; fourth, it
includes the independence of colonial territories. The reasoning that
informs these various definitional elements is enumerated below.
III. ETYMOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BASES OF SECESSION
The etymology of “secession” lies in the Latin terms “se” meaning
7
“apart” and “cedere” meaning “to go.” This indicates that secession is
synonymous with moving apart or withdrawing. This meaning is
mirrored by the Oxford English Dictionary which defines “secession” as
“[t]he action of seceding or formally withdrawing from an alliance, a
8
federation, a political or religious organization, or the like.” In an
abstract sense, secession is thus synonymous with withdrawal.
At this initial point it is apposite to consider whether the concept of
secession requires—from the perspective of the object undergoing
secession—endogenous or exogenous motivation. At first blush it might
seem that the definitions of secession cited above only require a
withdrawal, not an endogenously or exogenously motivated withdrawal.
To investigate this question further, it is useful to briefly consider the
definition of the related terms “annexation” and “cession.”
The etymology of “annexation” lies in the Latin term “annecetere”
9
which means “to bind to.” The Oxford English Dictionary similarly
defines “annex” as the “join[ing] in a subordinate capacity” and
7. Definition
of
Secession,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=secession&searchmode=term (last visited Feb. 18,
2013); see also Radan, supra note 6, at 18; Craven suggests that the Latin antecedent is
“secessionem.” See Greg Craven, ‘Of Federalism, Secession, Canada and Quebec’ (1991-1992)
14 THE DALHOUSIE L. J. 231, 232 (1991–1992); GREGORY CRAVEN, SECESSION: THE ULTIMATE
STATES RIGHT 3 (1986).
8. 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 348 (Clarendon Press, 1933). Other English language
dictionaries also define secession as synonymous with withdrawal. The Macquarie Dictionary
describes “secession” as “the act of seceding.” The same dictionary defines the term “seceding”
as “withdraw[ing] formally from an alliance or association, as from a political or religious
organization.” (Macquarie Dictionary 1277 (Macquarie, 4th ed. 2005)); The Collins English
Dictionary suggests that “secession” connotes “the act of seceding” with the same dictionary
defining the term “seceding” as “formal withdrawal of membership, as from a political alliance,
church, organization etc.” (Collins English Dictionary 1389 (Harper Collins, 4th ed. 1998)); see
also MILICA ZARKOVIC BOOKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF SECESSION 3 (St Martin’s Press, 1993).
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY
9. Definition
of
Annex,
ONLINE
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=annex&searchmode=none.
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“annexation” as the “attaching . . . [of a] possession, or territorial
10
dependency.” These definitions indicate that from the perspective of
the object being annexed, the incorporation is exogenous. This prompts
the question: are the concepts of secession and annexation synonymous?
The answer must be in the negative, as the two words are not used
interchangeably, thereby indicating that “secession” connotes
endogenous motivation.
This finding is reinforced by examination of the term “cession,”
the etymology of which lies in the Latin phrase “cedere” which means
11
“go away.” The Oxford English Dictionary concomitantly defines
12
“cession” as the “ceding” or “giving up” of an object. These
definitions indicate that an object that is ceded is under the control of an
exogenous force. The question must therefore be asked: are the concepts
of secession and cession synonymous? Given that the two words are not
used interchangeably, it would seem the answer is “no,” thus again
indicating that secession connotes endogenous motivation.
Bearing these conceptual points in mind, it is necessary to consider
the definition of secession specifically in the context of international
law and relations. In order to advance the definition of secession within
this context, it must first be ascertained within this particular context
what the term describes the secession of. An initial answer might be that
secession refers to the withdrawal of territory from part of an existing
state to create a new state. Whilst this answer is generally descriptive of
the factual events associated with secession, it does not fully describe
the legal processes that inform these factual events. A more detailed
answer is that secession refers to the withdrawal of territory and
sovereignty from part of an existing state to create a new state. Thus, it
is not only the loss of territory which is central, but also the legal title,
13
or sovereignty, asserted over this territory. This generates the
inevitable and controversial question: what is sovereignty?
14
The concept of “sovereignty” is notoriously vexing to define. A
10. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 339 (Clarendon Press, 1933).
11. Definition
of
Cession,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=cession&searchmode=none; Quoted in “Cede,”
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY
ONLINE
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=cede&searchmode=none.
12. 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 239 (Clarendon Press, 1933).
13. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 2
(Routledge, 7th ed. 1997).
14. The etymological basis of the word “sovereignty” lies in the Latin term “superanus”
meaning “chief” or “principal.” Quoted in Sovereignty” ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY,
http:/www/etymonline.com/index.php?search=sovereign&searchmode=none (last visited March
21, 2013); see also ESA PAASIVIRTA, Internationalization and Stabilization of Contracts Versus
State Sovereignty, 60 BRIT. Y.B. OF INTL. L., Vol. 60 331 (1989); THE EVOLUTION OF THE
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (Francis Kofi Abiew ed., 1999);

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Secession in International Law and Relations

347

useful starting point, however, is provided by the Corfu Channel Case
15
(UK v Albania), where Alvarez J noted that “[b]y sovereignty, we
understand the whole body of rules and attributes which the state
16
possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other states . . . .” A
17
priori, only states may possess and exercise sovereignty. The
definition also emphasizes the internal or domestic nature of
sovereignty, suggesting a state’s ability to legislate rules and procedures
throughout its territory without external interference.
Crawford has provided a more recent and detailed definition of
sovereignty:
In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for ‘the
totality of international rights and duties recognized by international
law’ as residing in an independent territorial unit—the State. It is
not itself a right, nor is it a criterion for statehood (sovereignty is an
attribute of States, not a precondition). It is a somewhat unhelpful
but firmly established, description of statehood; a brief term for the
18
State’s attribute of more-or-less plenary competence.

Crawford’s definition suggests that sovereignty is not a criterion of
statehood, but rather a descriptor thereof, and thus the withdrawal of
territory from part of an existing state to create a new state is, in effect,
a partial withdrawal of sovereignty. Once sovereignty over a given
territory has been withdrawn by the process of secession, the newly
created state then enjoys “more-or-less plenary legislative competence”
19
throughout its territory.
RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICT (1996); Robert
Trisotto, Seceding in the Twenty-First Century: A Paradigm for the Ages, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L. L.
422–25 (2010); For a particularly extensive discussion of the etymology of the term
“sovereignty” see GERARD KREIJEN, STATE FAILURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND EFFECTIVENESS:
LEGAL LESSONS FROM THE DECOLONIZATION OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 27–28 (2004).
15. Corfu Channel (U.K. and N. Ir. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949).
16. Id.
17. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE
ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 15 (1990); ABIEW, supra note 14, at 25.
18. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 32.
19. Id. Other scholars have espoused similar definitions of sovereignty: MARTIN DIXON,
TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (7th ed. 2013); Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty:
Juridical Underpinnings 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 375 (2003); ABIEW, supra note 14.
at 24–25; Samuel M Makinda, Sovereignty and International Security: Challenges for the United
Nations, 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 149, 150 (1996); CATHERINE J IORNS, Indigenous Peoples and
Self-Determination: Challenging State Sovereignty 24 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 199, 236 (1992);
Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law Context 26 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 417, 419–20 (2000–2001); see also STEPHEN D KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY 20–21 (1999); ROBERT JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY: EVOLUTION OF AN IDEA, 10–11
(2007); LUZIUS WILDHABER, Sovereignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE AND THEORY
427–52 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnson eds., 1983); ALAN JAMES,
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Importantly, Crawford’s definition does not equate the attribute of
sovereignty with absolute plenary legislative competence. This is
because sovereignty has traditionally been conceived as subject to the
20
overarching limits imposed by international law. This requirement
flows principally from the widely accepted premise that all states enjoy
21
equal sovereignty. In order for this proposition to possess any
meaningful significance, it follows that states must be free to exercise
plenary legislative competence only within their respective sovereign
territory.
In more recent times, sovereignty has undergone even more
substantial qualifications, particularly with the general acceptance of
22
peremptory norms (jus cogens). These norms, integrated into Article
53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in cases such as
23
Nicaragua v the United States of America, Case Concerning Oil
24
Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v the United States of America)
and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
25
Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) are non-derogable, requiring
SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1 (Paul Wilkinson ed., 1986);
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48–53 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed., 2005);
JOSHUA CASTELLINO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE INTERPLAY OF
THE POLITICS OF TERRITORIAL POSSESSION WITH FORMULATIONS OF POST-COLONIAL
‘NATIONAL’ IDENTITY 75–108 (2000); HANNUM, supra note 17, at 14–23; The realist scholar,
Morgenthau, describes sovereignty as “supreme power over a certain territory.” HANS
MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 13 (1973).
20. The term “independence” has been defined by Anzilotti J as “no more than the normal
condition of States according to international law; it may also be described as sovereignty
(suprema potestas), or external sovereignty, by which is meant that the State has over it no higher
authority than that of international law.” Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria (Ger. v.
Austria), Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) Nos. 41, 45, 57 (Mar. 19) (Individual
Opinion of Judge Anzilotti); see also Karima Bennoune, Sovereignty vs. Suffering? ReExamining Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens of Iraq, EUR. J. INT’L. L., 245–46
(2002).
21. In this regard see U.N. Charter arts. 2(1) and 2(7). See generally MICHAEL R FOWLER
AND JULIE M BUNCK, LAW, POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE 47 (1995) on the subject of
sovereign equality; EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 114–15, 120 (1972).
22. Jus cogens refers to “compelling law” and can be contrasted with jus dispositivum,
which refers to law “subject to the dispensation of the parties.” See ALEXANDER
ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8–9 (2006); CRAWFORD,
supra note 4, at 99–100; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 142.
23. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 100–01 (June 27).
24. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 330, 919 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion on Judge
Simma); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 260, 9146 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion on Judge
Kooijmans); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 291, part 1.1 (Nov. 6) (dissenting opinion on
Judge Elaraby).
25. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 122, 3.1 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Elaraby).
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observance from states even in the context of their domestic legislation.
Sovereignty is therefore not an absolutist concept.
The “qualified” approach to sovereignty, with its emphasis on
respect for international law and compliance with peremptory norms, is
26
thus the present article’s preferred interpretation. It follows then that
whenever sovereignty—as described above—is withdrawn from
territory forming part of an existing state to create a new state, secession
will have occurred.
IV. SECESSION IS A PROCESS AND AN OUTCOME
Another important conceptual issue relating to secession is that it
27
is a process which leads to an outcome. Kohen, for example, has
correctly observed that "[s]ecession is not an instant fact. It always
implies a complex series of claims and decisions, negotiations and/or
struggle, which may – or may not – lead to the creation of a new
28
State."
Crucially, the process by which withdrawal is achieved need not
have any impact upon the eventual outcome. This can be demonstrated
by way of a simple analogy. A car, for example, can be built precisely
to plan by a robotic or human assembly line. Although both cars are the
result of different production processes, the outcome is identical: a new
car.
The conflation of process and outcome outlined above, however, is
endemic throughout scholarly discussions of secession. Crawford has
defined secession as “the creation of a State by the use or threat of force
29
without the consent of the former sovereign." Secession can thus only
occur when the use or threat of force is employed without the existing
26. This approach is supported by various scholars: Dan Philpotti, Sovereignty, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ (last updated
June 8, 2010); JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE, LIVRE 1, CH. 6, 131 (1576);
Oscar Schachter, Sovereignty – Then and Now, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WANG TIEYA 671
(Ronald St. John MacDonald ed., 1994); IVAN A SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW
(11th ed., 1994); HANNUM, supra note 17, at 19; Clarence Jenks, The Thesis and Its Critics, in
SOVEREIGNTY WITHIN THE LAW II (Arthur Larson et al. eds., 1695); Manfred Lachs, The
Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Times, 169 RECUIL DES COURS
29–41 (1980–IV); Georg Nolte, Secession and External Intervention, in SECESSION:
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 65, 70 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed., 2006); Helmut Steinburger,
Sovereignty, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 518 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000); JAN H.W.
VERZUL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 265 (1968); IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed. 2008).
27. Pavković & Radan, supra note 6, at 7.
28. MARCELO G KOHEN, SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 14 (2006); see
also Bruno Coppieters, Introduction, in CONTEXTUALIZING SECESSION: NORMATIVE STUDIES IN
A COMP. PERSP. 4–5 (Bruno Coppieters and Richard Sakwa eds., 2003).
29. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 375 (emphasis added).
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state’s consent. Heraclides has similarly conditioned the outcome of
secession on the specific process by which it is achieved: “Secession is
a special kind of territorial separatism involving states. It is an abrupt
unilateral move to independence on the part of the region that is a
30
metropolitan territory of a sovereign independent state.” Remarkably,
Kohen, who has specifically alluded to secession as both a process and
an outcome, has also defined the term in relation to a specific process,
namely, “the creation of a new independent entity through the
separation of part of the territory . . . of an existing State, without the
31
consent of the latter.” Other scholars have devised similarly restrictive
32
definitions. Yet nowhere in the Latin antecedents for the term
“secession” and the dictionary definitions hitherto reviewed is the
outcome of secession made contingent on the specific process of
withdrawal. This indicates that attempts to narrow the definition of
secession in the international law and relations context cannot be
conceptually justified.
Once it is accepted that the specific process of withdrawal is
separate from the outcome, it emerges that there are two basic secession
types: consensual and unilateral. The former can be divided into two
further secession types: constitutional and politically negotiated. These
three secession processes are discussed below.
Constitutional secession occurs with the existing state’s consent,
and does not involve the use or threat of force. This secession type can
be divided into two sub-categories: negotiated and explicit. The former
occurs within the framework of the existing state’s constitution, even
though there are no specific constitutional provisions relating to
33
secession. Typically, a constitutional amendment is negotiated, which
allows for the lawful secession of part of the existing state’s territory. In
34
Reference re Secession of Quebec, for example, the Canadian
Supreme Court indicated that in the future, Quebec or any other
30. HERACLIDES, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
31. KOHEN, supra note 28, at 3 (emphasis added).
32. John Dugard, A Legal Basis for Secession – Relevant Principles and Rules, in
SECESSION AND INT’L L.: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 89, 89 (Julie Dahlitz,
ed. 2003); JO ERIC MURKENS, SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 9 (Jo Eric
Mukens et al. eds., 2002); Frida A. Pfirter and Silvina G. Napolitano, Secession and International
Law: Latin American Practice, in SECESSION, INT’L L. PERSPECTIVES 375 (Marcelo G. Kohen
ed., 2006); LINDA S. BISHAI, FORGETTING OURSELVES, SECESSION AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF
TERRITORIAL IDENTITY 33 (2004); GNANAPALA WELHENGAMA, MINORITIES’ CLAIMS: FROM
AUTONOMY TO SECESSION, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE PRACTICE 214 (2000); Yuchao
Zhu and Dongyan Blachford, Ethnic Dispute in International Politics: Manifestation and
Conceptualizations 12 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLITICS 25, 46 (2006).
33. Andrei Kreptul, The Constitutional Right of Secession in Political Theory and History
17(4) 39, 77 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD.
34. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.).
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Canadian province may be able to secede constitutionally from Canada,
provided a constitutional amendment effecting secession was
35
negotiated. In 2000, the Canadian federal parliament passed the
Clarity Act, which reaffirmed the constitutional process prescribed by
36
the Court: a clear referendum vote in favour of secession, followed by
37
negotiated agreement between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and
finally the passage of a constitutional amendment lawfully effecting
38
Quebec’s secession. Scholars such as Radan and Amar have deduced a
39
similar right from the Constitution of the United States (US),
notwithstanding the judgment of the US Supreme Court in Texas v
40
White, which has been traditionally regarded as precluding a
41
constitutional right to secession.
Explicit constitutional secession occurs when the existing state’s
constitution prescribes a specific procedure for the secession of part of
its territory, usually federal or provincial units. The 1921 Liechtenstein
42
43
Constitution, 1931 Chinese Constitution, 1947 Constitution of the
44
Union of Burma, 1968 Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist
35. See Peter Radan, Constitutional Law and Secession: The Case of Quebec, 2
MACARTHUR L. REV. 69–85 (1998); see generally Peter Radan, “You Can’t Always Get What
You Want”: The Territorial Scope of An Independent Quebec 41 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 629, 633
(2003); Pierre Bienvenu, Secession by Constitutional Means: Decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference 21 HAMLINE J. OF PUB. L. AND POL’Y 1, 1–65
(1999); Marc Arthur Thibodeau, The Legality of an Independent Quebec: Canadian
Constitutional Law and Self-Determination in International Law, 3 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
99, 99–142 (1979–80); Rosemary Rayfuse, Reference re Secession of Quebec from Canada:
Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, 21 UNSW L. J. 834, 839–41 (1998); Johan D van der Vyver, SelfDetermination of the Peoples of Quebec Under International Law, 10 FLA. ST. J. OF TRANSNAT’L
L. & POL’Y 8–11 (2000); Kevin MacMillan, Secession Perspectives and the Independence of
Quebec, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 333, 353–59 (1999); Jean Raby, Quebec: Trendsetter for a
Depolarized World?, 33 HARV. INT’L L. J. 441–58 (1992).
36. Clarity Act, S.C. 2000, c. 26, art. 1 (Can.); Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra
note 34, at 87.
37. Clarity Act, supra note 36, art. 2; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34, at
87–88.
38. Clarity Act, supra note 36, art. 3; Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34, at
94–97. In the aforementioned paragraphs, the Court noted, however, that an amendment to the
Constitution of Canada may be difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
39. Peter Radan, An Indestructible Union…of Indestructible States: The Supreme Court of
the United States and Secession, 10 LEGAL HISTORY 187, 195 (2006); Akhil Reed Amar, The
David C Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, U. ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1115
(2001).
40. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1869).
41. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 CHI. L. REV. 633 (1991).
42. LIECHTENSTEIN CONSTITUTION 1921, art. 4(2).
43. XIANFA art. 4 (1975) (China). This right was expressly expunged by Article 4 of the
1975 Chinese Constitution.
44. CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF BURMA 1947, ch. 10.
The right was expunged by the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of
Burma. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 99–100
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45

Republic, 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
46
47
Yugoslavia, and 1977 Constitution of the Soviet Union, for instance,
all alluded to the concept of secession (even if in an incomplete, vague
or only theoretical manner) for constituent national groups. More
48
recently, the 1984 Saint Christopher and Nevis Constitution, 1994
49
Ethiopian Constitution and 2003 Constitutional Charter of the State
50
Union of Serbia and Montenegro prescribed a specific procedure for
secession under certain circumstances.
Politically negotiated secession occurs with the existing state’s
consent and does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. It
requires that the existing state and the secessionist entity be willing to
politically negotiate the resolution of a secessionist situation. It is most
likely to occur when the existing state fails to provide any constitutional
avenue for secession for constituent national groups and when relations
51
between the existing sovereign and secessionist entity are amicable.
Numerous historical examples of politically negotiated secession exist.
In June 1905, Norway seceded from the Union of Sweden and Norway
after a plebiscite for independence was endorsed by ninety-nine percent
52
of Norwegians. In December 1918, following the “Act of Union,”
(1978); see Josef Silverstein, Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the
Union of Burma, 18 J. ASIAN STUD. 43–49 (1958); JORRI DUURSMA, FRAGMENTATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES 90 (1996).
45. 1968 CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC, Preamble; see
RAIČ, supra note 5, at 313–14.
46. 1974 SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA CONSTITUTION, Preamble.
47. KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977), art. 72 [KONST. SSSR][USSR CONSTITUTION] [hereinafter
USSR CONSTITUTION].
48. ST. CHRISTOPHER & NEVIS CONST., art. 113, §1 & 2 (1984); MIODRAG JOVANOVIĆ,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING SECESSION IN FEDERALIZED STATES: A PROCEDURAL APPROACH, 138–
39 (2007); Simeon C. R. McIntosh, The St. Kitts-Nevis Question: Secession or Constitutional
Reform?, 7 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 419–63 (1997).
49. 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia, art. 60 § 1, 4, 5; Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in
Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution 35(2) PUBLIUS 313, 313–35 (2005);
Ugo A Mattei, The New Ethiopian Constitution: First Thoughts on Ethnical Federalism and the
Reception of Western Institutions, CARDOZO ELECTRONIC L. BULLETIN, available at
http://www.jus.unitn.it/cardozo/Review/Constitutional/Mattei2.html; Alem Habtu, Ethnic
Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation, 28 DIALECTICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 91–123 (2004); Minasse Haile, The New Ethiopian Constitution: Its Impact
upon Unity, Human Rights and Development, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 33 (1996).
50. See Ethiopian Constitution, supra note 49; Art. 60 of the now defunct 2003
Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro §§ 1–5; see Miodrag
Jovanović, Consensual Secession of Montenegro – Towards Good Practice?, in ON THE WAY TO
STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALIZATION 138 (Aleksandar Pavković & Peter Radan eds.,
2008); see JOVANOVIĆ, supra note 48, at 126–28.
51. See generally Robert A Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen? CAN. J. OF POL.
SCI. 773, 773–92 (1994).
52. Id. at 781–83; KAREN LARSEN, A HISTORY OF NORWAY 484–95 (1948); MARGARET
STEWART OMRčANIN, NORWAY, SWEDEN CROATIA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF STATE
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Iceland seceded from Denmark and assumed the status of an
independent state, although still remaining under the personal union of
53
the Danish Monarchy.
In 1922, Southern Ireland gained its
independence from the United Kingdom after an act of British
54
parliament relinquished the territory. In August 1960, the Senegal
government seceded from the Mali Federation, arguing that the
federation was comprised of sovereign states, all of which retained an
55
inherent right to withdraw. In November 1961, Syria withdrew from
56
the United Arab Republic. In August 1965, Singapore seceded from
the Malaysian Federation with the latter’s legislature passing a bill to
57
effect separation. In September 1991, after a period of considerable
political confusion, the Soviet Government recognized the sovereign
independence of former union republics: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
which opened the way for other union republics, such as Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to also negotiate their
58
secession from the USSR. In January 1993, Czechoslovakia was
peacefully dissolved by the respective secessions of the Czech Republic
59
and the Slovak Republic.
Unilateral secession occurs without the existing state’s consent
60
and may also involve the use or threat of force. It usually occurs in the
absence of relevant constitutional provisions and political negotiation.
SECESSION AND FORMATION 9–11 (1976); JANE JACOBS, THE QUEST OF SEPARATISM: QUEBEC
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER SOVEREIGNTY 26–51 (1981).
53. RICHARD F. TOMASSON, ICELAND: THE FIRST NEW SOCIETY 21 (1980); GUNNAR
KARLSSON,. THE HISTORY OF ICELAND 280–84 (2000).
54. Bill Kissane, The Doctrine of Self-Determination and the Irish Move to Independence,
1916-1922, 8 J. OF POL. IDEOLOGIES 327 (2002); see Stephane Dion, Why is Secession Difficult
in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec, 26(2) BRIT. J. OF POL. SC. 269, 270
(1996).
55. Buchheit, supra note 44, at 99; Rosalyn Cohen, Legal Problems Arising from the
Dissolution of the Mali Federation, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 376 (1960); WILLIAM F. FOLTZ,
FROM FRENCH WEST AFRICA TO THE MALI FEDERATION (1965); SHELDON GELLAR, SENEGAL:
AFRICAN NATION BETWEEN ISLAM AND THE WEST 20–21 (1982).
56. Buchheit, supra note 44, at 99.
57. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 314–15.
58. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 395; Regarding the independence of the Baltic
republics, see also Rein Müllerson, The Continuity and Succession of States, by Reference to the
Former USSR and Yugoslavia, 42(3) INT’L AND COMP. L.Q. 473, 480–81. (1993) (regarding the
independence of the Baltic republics).
59. Jiri Malenovsky, Problèmes juridiques liés à la Partition de la Tchécoslovaquie, y
Compris Tracé de la Frontier, 39 ANNUARIE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INT’L 305 (1993); Jon Elster,
Transition, Constitution-Making and Separation in Czechoslovakia, 36 EUR. J. SOC. 105–34
(1995); ABBY INNES, CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE SHORT GOODBYE 176–219 (2001); Pavković &
Radan, supra note 6, at 73–78.
60. According to the definition of secession provided by Crawford, unilateral secession and
the use or threat of force are concomitant. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 375.
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However unilateral secession can occur despite the existence of
constitutional provisions (which are either deemed inadequate by the
secessionist entity or ignored), and can be preceded by initial attempts
at political negotiation, which ultimately fail.
When unilateral secession occurs, the existing state’s claim to
sovereignty over the seceding territory conflicts with that of the
(putative) secessionist state. This impasse attracts the supervening
jurisdiction of international law, which then purports to employ legal
principles to resolve the dispute. Foremost among such principles is the
international law of self-determination, as developed and applied by UN
instruments such as the UN Charter, the Declaration on the Granting of
61
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the International
62
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
63
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights the Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
64
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations,
and Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
65
United Nations.
66
Examples of successful unilateral colonial secessions include
Indonesia (the Netherlands), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
67
(France), Algeria (France) and Guinea-Bissau (Portugal).
The
independence of Bangladesh (Pakistan), Eritrea (Ethiopia), BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia and
Kosovo (Yugoslavia) and South Sudan (Sudan) are arguably instances
68
of successful unilateral non-colonial (UNC) secessions. Other attempts
at UNC secession, such as Tibet (China), Katanga (Congo), Biafra
(Nigeria), Kashmir (India), the Karen and Shan States (Burma), the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Cyprus), Tamil Elam (Sri
61. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/1541 (Dec. 14, 1960).
62. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966) (The Economic Rights
Covenant entered into force as a treaty on 3 January 1976).
63. Id. (The Civil Rights Covenant entered into force as a treaty on 23 March 1976.).
64. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970).
65. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/3314 (Oct. 24, 1995).
66. For why decolonization constitutes secession, see the present article infra.
67. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 384–88.
68. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 391. South Sudan might alternatively be considered a
consensual secession, given that it was ultimately achieved by way of a referendum. See Anthony
J. Christopher, Secession and South Sudan: an African Precedent for the Future?, 93 S. AFR.
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 125, 125–32 (2011) (explaining that an agreement regarding a constitutional
means of attaining secession was effective); see Peter Radan, Secessionist Referenda in
International and Domestic Law, 18 NATIONALISM & ETHNIC POLS. 8–21 (2012). It should be
noted, however, that this vote was the ultimate culmination of “the longest civil conflict on the
continent [of Africa].” Khalid Medani, Strife and Secession in Sudan, 22 J. DEMOCRACY 135,
135 (2011). The secession of South Sudan might therefore be classified as unilateral in substance.
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Lanka), Kurdistan (Iraq/Turkey), Bougainville (Papua New Guinea),
Serbian Krajina (Croatia), Anjounan (the Islamic Republic of
Comoros), Nagorny-Kharabakh (Azerbaijan), Somaliland (Somalia),
Chechnya (Russian Federation), Gagauzia (Moldova), Transnistria
69
70
(Moldova), Abkhazia (Georgia) and South Ossetia (Georgia), have
71
been unsuccessful.
V. WHEN DOES THE PROCESS OF SECESSION CONCLUDE
AND THE OUTCOME BEGIN?
Once it is accepted that secession is a process that leads to an
outcome, it must be determined how the process is distinguishable from
the outcome. The short answer is that the process ends and the outcome
begins when the seceding territory completes the transformation to a
new state. Yet trying to determine precisely when this transformation
occurs is a complex (and controversial) issue. This is mainly due to the
ongoing conflict between the declaratory, constitutive and constitutivecollective recognition theories. The declaratory recognition theory,
propounded by scholars such as Chen, Brierly, Crawford, Raič and
72
Cassese maintains that recognition is not a sine qua non for statehood.
The constitutive recognition theory, advocated by scholars such as
Oppenheim, Lauterpacht and Roth postulates that recognition is a sine
73
qua non for statehood. The constitutive-collective recognition theory,
argued by scholars such as Kelsen and Dugard similarly suggests that
69. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 403; Abkhazia may eventually become a successful UNC
secession, given that the Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu
have extended recognition on the 26 August 2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15
December 2009, 15 December 2009, 23 May 2011 and 18 September 2011 respectively. But see
Jelena Radoman, Future Kosovo Status – Precedent or Universal Solution, 3 W. BALKANS SEC.
OBSERVER 14 (2006) for discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in general; see also CRISIS
MANAGEMENT INITIATIVE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN GEORGIA: A SYNTHESIS ANALYSIS WITH
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 1–58 (Antje Herrberg ed., 2006) for discussion of the Abkhazia conflict in
general.
70. South Ossetia may eventually become a successful UNC secession, given that the
Russian Federation, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and Tuvalu have extended recognition on the
26 August 2008, 5 September 2008, 10 September 2009, 15 December 2009, and 19 September
2011 respectively. For discussion of the South Ossetia Conflict in general, see Herrberg, supra
note 69; see also Gerard Toal, Russia’s Kosovo: A Critical Geopolitics of the August 2008 War
Over South Ossetia, 49 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 670 (2009).
71. See CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 403; Herrberg, supra note 69, at 13.
72. See TI-CHIANG CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION: WITH SPECIFIC
REFERENCE TO PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 14 (1951); J. L. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 139
(Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 22–23 and 26; RAIČ, supra
note 5, at 89–167; Cassese, supra note 19, at 73–77.
73. See Lassa F L Oppenheim, International Law, in 1 THE LAW OF PEACE 125–26 (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53
YALE L. J. 385 (1944); Brad R Roth, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INT’L L. 128 (2000).
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collective recognition by international organisations is a sine qua non
74
for statehood. The difference between the three recognition theories is
important in the context of secession, because depending on which one
is accepted, the process of secession ends and the outcome begins at
different points. For proponents of the declaratory theory, this critical
point prima facie occurs when a putative state satisfies the criteria for
75
statehood based on effectiveness. For proponents of the constitutive
theory, this point definitively occurs when a putative state satisfies the
criteria for statehood based on effectiveness and attains the recognition
of other states. For proponents of the constitutive-collective theory, this
point definitively occurs when a putative state satisfies the criteria for
statehood based on effectiveness and attains admission to the UN.
In order to determine when the process of secession ends and the
outcome begins, two interrelated questions must be addressed: first, it
must be ascertained what the generally accepted criteria for statehood
based on effectiveness common to the declaratory, constitutive and
constitutive-collective recognition theories are; and second, it must be
determined, de lege lata, whether the recognition of other states is a sine
qua non for statehood.
VI. WHAT ARE THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD
BASED ON EFFECTIVENESS COMMON TO THE DECLARATORY,
CONSTITUTIVE AND CONSTITUTIVE-COLLECTIVE RECOGNITION
THEORIES?
The declaratory, constitutive and constitutive-collective
recognition theories hold that a putative state must satisfy the four
criteria enumerated in Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States, which stipulates:
The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined
territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations
with other states.

Although these four criteria have been generally regarded as
orthodoxy, an additional fifth criterion—independence—has also been
widely held as essential to the satisfaction of the criteria for statehood
74. See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS
FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS 79 (1951); JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS
73, 79 (1987).
75. It prima facie occurs because the declaratory theory entails consideration of the impact
of peremptory norm (jus cogens) violations which will invalidate a seceding territory’s claim to
statehood. If there are no peremptory norm violations, then statehood will be achieved. See the
present article infra.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Secession in International Law and Relations

357

based on effectiveness, and is thus common to proponents of the
declaratory, constitutive and constitutive-collective recognition
76
theories.
A detailed overview of these five criteria is beyond the
scope of the present article, but the following skeletal points might
nonetheless be observed.
First, Oppenheim has defined a permanent population as “an
aggregate of individuals of both sexes who live together as a community
in spite of the fact that they may belong to different races or creeds, or
77
be of different colour.” A permanent population, however, need not be
78
a constant one. In the Western Sahara Case, for example, the ICJ
79
ruled that nomadic tribes satisfied the criterion. On the other hand,
populations which only move into a territory for the purpose of gaining
economic benefit, or to conduct scientific research, do not satisfy the
80
criterion.
Second, a state must possess a defined territory. It is throughout
this territory that the state exercises sovereignty. A defined territory
does not, however, require an absence of undisputed frontiers. A 1929
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal emphasized this point,
remarking:
Whatever may be the importance of the delimitation of
boundaries, one cannot go so far as to maintain that as long as this
delimitation has not been legally effected the State in question
cannot be considered as having any territory whatever. In order to
say that a State exists it is enough that this territory has a sufficient
consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been
accurately delimited, and that the State actually exercises
81
independent public authority over that territory.

This general rule was later affirmed by the ICJ in the North Sea
82
Continental Shelf Cases and Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute
83
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad).
76. The independence criterion is arguably subsumable within art 1(d) of the 1933
Montevideo Convention. See generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 62; RAIČ, supra note 5, at
74.
77. Oppenheim, supra note 73, at 118.
78. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
79. Id. at 342–44; see generally Gino J. Naldi, The Statehood of the Saharan Arab
Democratic Republic, 25 J. INDIAN INT’L. L. 448, 452–53 (1985); DIXON, supra note 19, at 119.
80. Antarctica, for example, which is populated by scientific personnel, is not a state. See
generally Bengt Broms, States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 44
(Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991); MALANCZUK, supra note 13, at 76.
81. Deutsch Continental Gas Gesellschaft v. Polish State, 5 I.L.R. 11, 14–15 (1929); see
generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 49–50; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 61.
82. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den. & Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 32
(Judgments); see generally, CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 50.
83. Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J.
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Third, in relation to the effective government criterion, recent
scholarship by Raič has indicated that a state created by secession
pursuant to the law of self-determination will not, by virtue of the
84
“compensatory force principle,” be required to strictly satisfy the
85
effective government criterion. In the case of consensual secession,
where there is no clash of sovereignty between the existing state and
putative secessionist state, the application of this principle is relatively
uncontroversial: the degree of governmental effectiveness required is
substantially reduced. In the case of unilateral secession, however, the
situation is more nuanced. Drawing upon case studies from the colonial
context (Congo, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau and Angola) as well as the noncolonial context (Bangladesh, Croatia and Kosovo), the compensatory
force principle indicates that the government can be somewhat
ineffective, or of minimal utility, with respect to effective control
throughout its territory.86 Conversely, as indicated by the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it
would seem that a territorial entity created by secession not in
conformity with the law of self-determination (i.e., not established in
response to deliberate, sustained and systematic government-sponsored
discrimination) will simply be unable to satisfy the effective
government criterion.87 Thus, in the state creation context, the effective
government criterion has been arguably reformulated to equate with the
88
right of peoples to external self-determination.
Having elaborated this general principle, however, it is apposite to
note that it is not absolute. The independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina
from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), for
example, cannot be easily explained by the operation of the law of self89
determination and the compensatory force principle. At the time of its
6, 44, 52 (Feb. 3)(Judgment); see generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 50.
84. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 104.
85. Id. at 104, 364; BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 71; MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 205 (Cambridge, 6th ed., 2008); DUGARD RECOGNITION, supra note 74, at 78–79.
86. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 394.
87. Id.
88. DUGARD RECOGNITION, supra note 74, at 79.
89. Other secessions related to the break-up of Yugoslavia which occurred after 1992 – the
date at which the SFRY is generally accepted to have entered a state of dissolution and thus
extinction – need not be explained by the law of self-determination and the compensatory force
principle. The secession of Slovenia could perhaps be described as quasi-consensual. Slovenia
declared its independence on June 25, 1991 and the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), substantially
under the control of the Serb-dominated federal Secretariat for National Defence, occupied
strategic points in Slovenia. After a few days of strong resistance by Slovenian militia forces, a
ceasefire was agreed, known as the Brioni Accord. Soon thereafter the federal presidency ordered
the JNA to withdraw from Slovenia. In October of 1991 Slovenia again declared its
independence, and this time the JNA made no response, thereby indicating acquiescence with
Slovene independence. See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the
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independence, Bosnia-Herzegovina did not strictly satisfy the effective
government criterion, with various parts of the Republic’s territory
remaining beyond the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government’s control.90
Furthermore, it was not clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina was established
pursuant to the law of self-determination, which permits the unilateral
pursuit of external self-determination by peoples when their internal
self-determination is consistently and egregiously denied by the existing
state. As Raič has observed:
Even if it would be accepted that Bosnia-Herzegovina seceded
from the SFRY unilaterally, and assuming for the moment that the
[Bosnian Muslims] formed a ‘people’ in an ethnic sense and thus a
collectivity potentially entitled to a right of secession, the question
must be addressed whether the [Bosnian Muslims] were in practice
exposed to such harm (in the form of, for instance, a serious
violation of their right of internal self-determination and/or serious
and widespread violations of their individual human rights) prior to
the proclamation of independence in March 1992, that the relevant
secession has to be considered the ultimum remedium for
safeguarding their identity, freedom and human rights. On the basis
of the facts of the relevant period, the answer can only be in the
negative. For the [Bosnian Muslims] were exposed to serious and
widespread violations of their human rights only after the
91
proclamation of independence.

Despite the exceptional case of Bosnia-Herzegovina it would
nonetheless seem, from the case studies mentioned above, that the
compensatory force principle is generally valid, functioning to reduce
the stringency of the effective government criterion when the newly
created state is established pursuant to the law of self-determination.
Bosnia-Herzegovina should therefore be viewed as an aberration based
upon political and factual expediency.
Fourth, a state must have the ability to enter relations with other
states, which requires that it must politically and legally represent itself
92
to other states and within international forums. As Crawford has
noted, however, in terms of its practical implications, the criterion
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569 (1992); STEVE TERRETT, THE
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL STUDY OF
PEACEMAKING IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (2000); Macedonia’s secession formally
occurred once the SFRY was dissolved, thereby ensuring that no existing state remained to
challenge Macedonian independence. See PETER RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (2002) [hereinafter RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA].
90. Weller, supra note 89, at 590.
91. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 415–16.
92. Note though, that it does not require that a state must represent itself to other states and
international forums; see id. at 73.
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represents a conflation of the effective government and independence
93
criteria.
Fifth, in relation to the independence criterion, it has been argued
that a state created by secession must demonstrate formal and actual
independence.94 The former requires that the state created manifest the
formal hallmarks of independence, while the latter requires the absence
of political control by other states. 95
In summation, before the process of secession can be said to have
concluded, these five criteria based on effectiveness must be fulfilled by
any putative secessionist state.
VII. IS THE RECOGNITION OF OTHER STATES A SINE QUA NON
FOR STATEHOOD?
Having enumerated the five criteria for statehood based on
effectiveness, it remains to be determined whether the recognition of
other states is a sine qua non for statehood. In other words, must other
states have extended recognition to a putative secessionist state before it
can legally claim statehood? The resolution of this question is different
depending on which of the declaratory, constitutive or constitutivecollective recognition, theories is accepted as most accurately
96
representing lex lata.
VIII. THE DECLARATORY RECOGNITION THEORY
With regard to treaty law, no support exists for the position that
recognition is a sine qua non for statehood. The most influential
international treaty—the UN Charter—is completely silent on the topic.
Regional treaties, however, indicate support for the declaratory
approach. Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention and Articles 13 and
14 of the Charter of the Organization of American States suggest that
statehood antedates recognition, thereby supporting the declaratory
recognition theory.
State practice also indicates that the declaratory theory is generally
93. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 62.
94. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 75.
95. Id. at 78.
96. There are of course commentators that hold none of these theoretical approaches are
appropriate. Worster, for example, has noted that, “[a]lthough many authors state that one or the
other theory is confirmed by practice, the record does not bear this statement out; neither of these
two theories [the declaratory and constitutive] satisfactorily describes the state of law on the
matter.” William Thomas Worster, Law, Politics and the Conception of the State in Recognition
Theory, 27 B.U. INT'L L. J., 115, 118–19 (2009); contra Crawford, who has suggested that
“[s]ome continental writers . . . have tended to regard recognition as combining both declaratory
and constitutive elements. One can sympathize with these views, but at a fundamental level a
choice has to be made.” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 27.
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correct. In December 1974, for example, the General Assembly adopted
97
the non-binding Definition of Aggression, Article 1 of which provided
the following definitions:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Explanatory note: In this Definition the term “State”:
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to
whether a State is a member of the United Nations;
(b) Includes the concept of a “group of States” where appropriate.

Article 1 thus indicates that states can exist irrespective of whether
they are recognized by other states or are members of the UN. A priori,
the Definition of Aggression, which was adopted by consensus,
confirms the validity of the declaratory recognition theory.
The declaratory recognition theory is also supported with respect
to the break-up of the SFRY. On 2 May 1992, European Community
(EC) member states declared in relation to the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) that “[t]hey are willing to recognize
that State as a sovereign and independent State, within its existing
borders, and under a name that can be accepted by all parties
98
concerned.” Hence, the Republic of Macedonia was considered to
constitute a state—not an entity, territorial entity or putative state—
prior to receiving the recognition of EC member states. A similar
situation occurred regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
Montenegro). This state was established in 1992, but recognition was
only granted in 1996. Nonetheless, numerous diplomatic statements
recognized that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a state under
international law from 1992 onwards, despite not having received
99
recognition.
With regard to judicial decisions, the preponderance of evidence
once again indicates support for the declaratory theory. A 1929
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, when commenting upon
97. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974).
98. RAIČ, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting EPC Informal Meeting of Ministers for Foreign
Affairs, Declaration on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Guimaraes, 1-2 May 1992,
EPC Press Release 53/92) (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., Committee of Senior Officials of the Helsinki, SCO Declaration concerning
the Need for Undertaking Urgent and Immediate Steps With Respect to Yugoslavia, in
YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH DOCUMENTS: FROM ITS CREATION TO ITS DISSOLUTION 22 (May 20,
1992); Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Resolution 1/6-Ex on the Situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 6th Sess., Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1–2 (Dec. 1992); see generally
RAIČ, supra note 5, at 36.
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Poland’s existence stated that “'the recognition of a State is not
constitutive but merely declaratory. The State exists by itself and the
recognition is nothing else than a declaration of this existence,
100
recognized by the States from which it emanates.'”
Support for the declaratory position is also found within the report
of the Commission of Jurists relating to the Aaland Islands dispute. The
report's section dealing with Finland’s independence noted the various
recognitions Finland had received, but subsequently elaborated that:
these facts by themselves do not suffice to prove that Finland, from
this time onwards, became a sovereign State . . . [T]he same legal
value cannot be attached to recognition of new States in war-time,
especially to that accorded to belligerent powers, as in normal times
. . . In addition to these facts which bear upon the external relations
of Finland, the very abnormal character of her internal situation
must be brought out. This situation was such that, for a considerable
time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State
101
did not exist.

It follows that although Finland enjoyed the recognition of
numerous states, this did not, ipso facto, mandate that Finland possessed
statehood. Although the Commission clearly regarded the recognitions
extended as legally relevant, they were not taken as conclusive, with
considerations of the “conditions required for the formation of a
102
sovereign State” also necessary.
More recent support for the declaratory recognition theory can be
found in the decisions of the Badinter Arbitration Commission,
established to advise the European Peace Conference on Yugoslavia. In
103
its Opinion No. 1,
handed down on 29 November, 1991, the
Commission stated that “the effects of recognition by other states are
104
105
purely declaratory.” This position was reiterated by Opinion No. 8,
handed down on 4 July 1992, which held that “recognition of a State by
106
107
other States [only has] declarative value . . . .” Opinion No. 10,
100. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Deutsch Continental Gas Gesellschaft v.
Polish State, 5 I.L.R. 11, 13 (1929) (emphasis added) (alterations omitted); see generally RAIČ,
supra note 4, at 37;
101. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (quoting Aaland Islands Question, Report of the
International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the
Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, 3
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL 8 (Oct. 1920).
102. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24.
103. Arbitration Commission on the Peace Conference in Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1421, 1494–
95 (1992) [hereinafter Badinter Arbitration Commission]
104. Id. (emphasis added); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 24 (emphasis added).
105. Badinter Arbitration Commission, supra note 103, at 1522–23.
106. Id. (emphasis added); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 399 (emphasis added).
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also delivered on 4 July 1992, reaffirmed this view, stating that
“recognition is not a prerequisite for the foundation of a State and is
108
purely declaratory in its impact.” The Commission thus propounded
that statehood is constituted prior to any acts of recognition, provided
109
that the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness are fulfilled.
Support for the declaratory recognition theory is also arguably
found within the Canadian Supreme Court advisory opinion, Reference
110
re Secession of Quebec.
There, the court noted that although
recognitions would be politically advantageous for a newly seceded
Quebec, they would not be a sine qua non for statehood. Indeed the
court explicitly held that “recognition by other states is not . . .
111
necessary to achieve statehood.” The Court therefore rejected the
112
constitutive recognition theory.
Further support for the declaratory view is arguably contained
113
within the Bosnian Genocide Case. In that case, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia argued that the ICJ was not competent to adjudicate
claims on the Genocide Convention, because the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina had not recognized each other at
the time the legal proceedings were commenced.114 The ICJ rejected
this argument, noting that mutual recognition had subsequently been
granted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
115
Herzegovina (Dayton Accord), and that any chronological defects
116
could be overcome by re-filing the claim after this time. This suggests
that Bosnia-Herzegovina's rights were opposable to the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia from the time the former became a state in fact,
117
notwithstanding the lack of recognition between the two parties.
Hence, the ICJ implicitly endorsed the declaratory recognition theory,
thereby discounting the constitutive view that statehood only

107. Badinter Arbitration Commission, supra note 103, at 1525–26.
108. Id. at 1526; see also RAIČ, supra note 5, at 37.
109. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 399.
110. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 34.
111. Id.
112. See RAIČ, supra note 5, at 37 (claiming that “[t]he Canadian Supreme Court rejected the
constitutive theory in Reference re Secession of Quebec”).
113. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11,
1996).
114. Id. at 612–14.
115. The Agreement was finalized on December 14, 1995. See also NATO, 15 years ago,
Dayton Peace Accords: a milestone for NATO and the Balkans (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_69290.htm.
116. Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia, supra note 113, at 612–13.
117. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 25.
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118

crystallizes post-recognition.
The declaratory recognition theory also enjoys preponderant
support from eminent scholars. Chen has argued that “whenever a State
in fact exists, it is at once subject to international law, independently of
119
the wills or actions of other States.”
The same scholar has also
observed that “[a] State may exist without positive relations with other
States; but it is not without rights or without means of exercising them .
120
. . ."
Thus, the grant of recognition from existing states or
international organizations, such as the UN, is not considered a
constitutive component of statehood. Brierly has similarly contended
that:
[t]he better view is that the granting of recognition to a new state is
not a ‘constitutive’ but a ‘declaratory’ act; it does not bring into
legal existence a state which did not exist before. A state may exist
without being recognized, and if it does exist in fact, then, whether
or not it has been formally recognized by other states, it has a right
to be treated by them as a state. The primary function of recognition
is to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been
uncertain, namely the independence of the body claiming to be a
state, and to declare the recognizing state’s readiness to accept the
normal consequences of that fact, namely the usual courtesies of
121
international intercourse.

Or as Crawford has observed:
[The declaratory] position has the merit of avoiding the logical and
practical difficulties involved in the constitutive theory, while still
accepting a role for recognition as a matter of practice. It has the
further, essential, merit of consistency with that practice, and it is
122
supported by a substantial body of opinion.
123

Other scholars have propounded similar views.

118. Id.
119. Ti-Chiang Chen, supra note 72, at 14.
120. Id. at 38.
121. BRIERLY, supra note 72, at 137–39.
122. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 22–23.
123. BROWNLIE, supra note 26, at 88; CASSESE, supra note 19, at 73–75; DIXON, supra note
19, at 135; MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 60–63
(6th ed. 1987); John Fischer Williams, Some Thoughts on the Doctrine of Recognition in
International Law, 47 HARV. L. REV. 776, 778–79 (1934); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI,
PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); LOUIS L JAFFÉ, JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS; IN PARTICULAR OF THE RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN POWERS 97–98, 372
(1933); Edwin M Borchard, Recognition and Non-recognition 36 AM. J, INT’L L. 108 (1942);
Rafael W Erich, La naissance et la reconnaissance des États, 13 RECUEIL DES COURS, 461
(1926); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in International Law, 53 YALE L. J.
385, 424 (1944); ALEXANDRE MÉRIGNHAC, 1 TRAITÉ DE DROIT PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 328
(1905); ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 13–14,
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IX. THE CONSTITUTIVE AND CONSTITUTIVE-COLLECTIVE
RECOGNITION THEORIES
Unlike the declaratory recognition theory, no treaty provisions
exist which support the constitutive theory either implicitly or
explicitly. With regard to the constitutive-collective theory, it has been
suggested that Article 4 of the UN Charter may imply that admission to
the UN is tantamount to the conferral of statehood by collective
124
means. Article 4 of the UN Charter provides that:
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peaceloving States which accept the obligations contained in the present
Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and
willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United
Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly
125
upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
126

Articles 4(1) and 4(2) thus restrict membership to states only.
The suggestion that Article 4 implies a collective conferral of statehood,
however, must be rejected, as examination of the Charter’s travaux
préparatoires indicates that a Norwegian proposal to endow the UN
with the power to recommend collective recognition of statehood was

147–48 (1986); Karl Doehring, State, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 600, 604 (Rudolf
Bernhardt ed., 1992); Philip Marshall Brown, The Effects of Recognition, 36 AM. J. OF INT’L. L.
106 (1942); Josef L. Kunz, Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht’s “Recognition in International
Law,” 44 AM. J. OF INT’L. L. 713 (1950); KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF
STATES IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 130–61 (2d ed. 1968); Manfred Lachs, Recognition and
Modern Methods of International Co-operation, 35 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 252 (1959); ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 135–36 (1963); J. G. STARKE, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–100
(1965); 1 DANIEL PATRICK O’ CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 81, 128–34, (Stevens ed., 2d ed.
1970); JAMES E. S. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS 49, 55 (2d ed. 1971); J. S. Davidson,
Beyond Recognition, 32 N. IR. L. Q. 22 (1981); P. K. MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: BASIC PRINCIPLES 13 (1994); Donald A Heydt, Non-recognition and the
Independence of Transkei, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 167, 185 (1978); Colin Warbrick,
Recognition of States: Recent European Practice, in ASPECTS OF STATEHOOD AND
INSTITUTIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE, 24–30 (Malcolm Evans ed., 1997); BURNS
WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM ORIENTED
COURSEBOOK 847 (2nd ed. 1980); Jure Vidmar, Conceptualizing Declarations of Independence
and International Law 32, OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 2, 5 (2011).
124. See KELSEN, supra note 74, at 79.
125. Id.; U.N. Charter arts 2(1) and 2(7); Statute of the International Court of Justice (June
26, 1945).
126. This wording contrasts with Article 1(2) of the League of Nations Covenant, which
allowed membership by “any fully governing State, Dominion or Colony.” The wording of
Article 4, therefore, was purposeful, designed to exclude entities that were not states. See
DUGARD, supra note 74, at 52; Konrad Ginther, Article 4, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 162 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994).
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127

discarded. Furthermore, history reveals that on occasion, territorial
entities have been admitted to the UN which did not at the time of
admittance, stricto sensu, qualify as states: the Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are but two
128
examples.
Very little evidence in support of the constitutive recognition
theory can be gleaned from state practice. However, several scholars
have contended—if only very cautiously—that the practice of EC states
during the break-up of the SFRY and the Soviet Union may represent an
affirmation of the constitutive recognition theory. This is because
recognition in these contexts was predicated not only on the criteria for
statehood based on effectiveness, as outlined by the Montevideo
Convention, but also additional grounds, enumerated by the Declaration
129
on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States.
These
Guidelines provided that recognition should only be granted to states
that respect the provisions of the UN Charter, guarantee the human
rights of any ethnic and national minorities, respect the inviolability of
internationally recognized boundaries, subscribe to nuclear non130
proliferation and meet international standards regarding human rights.
By moving beyond the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness,
scholars such as Hillgruber interpret EC states as having adopted a
predominantly constitutive approach to recognition, as the acquisition of
statehood seems to be predicated upon arbitrary Euro-centric criteria
131
devoid of legal precedent.
127. United Nations Conference on International Organization, Amendments and
Observations on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, submitted by the Norwegian Delegation, U.N.
Doc. 2 G/7, ¶¶ 1, 2 (May 3, 1945). As Aufricht has correctly observed “it was the intention of the
authors of the Charter not to interpret admission to membership as equivalent to collective
recognition of States or governments, except for the purposes of membership in the
Organization,” quoted in Hans Aufricht, Principles and Practice of Recognition by International
Organizations, 43 AM. J. INT’L. L., 691 (1949); see generally RAIČ, supra note 5, at 42; Van der
Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23 (1991).
128. KONRAD G. BÜHLER, STATE SUCCESSION AND MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL THEORIES VERSUS POLITICAL PRAGMATISM 172–73 (2001); RAIČ,
supra note 5, at 43–44.
129. European Community: Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States,
International Legal Materials, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1485–87 (1992).
130. Id.; see generally, SHEARER, supra note 26, at 125; Roland Rich, Recognition of States:
The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L 36, 43 (1993); Colin
Warbrick, Recognition of States, 4 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 473, 477–78 (1992).
131. Interestingly, Hillgruber seems to start from the premise that the constitutive theory is
correct before examining the operation of the EC Guidelines for Recognition of New States. He
does so on the grounds that non-recognition could not be utilized as a weapon against renegade
states, if compliance with the Montevideo Convention was the only requirement of statehood.
This assumes, however, that recognition and statehood are necessarily coterminous. See Christian
Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 494
(1998).
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The legitimacy of this claim, however, is highly suspect. To begin
with, the long title of the Guidelines—Declaration on the Guidelines on
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet
Union—inherently suggests that they are targeting acts of recognition
and not the conferral of statehood. This view is also borne out by
reference to the language employed throughout the Guidelines, which
arguably suggests that new states may exist prior to recognition.
Paragraph 4, for example, enunciates that:
The Community and it Member States confirm their attachment to
the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in
particular the principle of self-determination. They affirm their
readiness to recognise, subject to the normal standards of
international practice and the political realities in each case, those
new states which, following the historic changes in the region, have
constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have accepted the
appropriate international obligations and have committed
themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to
132
negotiations.

Had the Guidelines been intended to propound a constitutive
approach to recognition, paragraph four would more than likely have
employed the words “entity,” “territorial entity” or “putative state” in
place of the word “state.” The correct interpretation then is that the
Guidelines were designed to mould a common recognition policy
among EC member states, rather than serving to confirm statehood
133
itself.
According to this interpretation, the Guidelines are wholly
134
subsumable within the declaratory recognition theory.
Finally it should be noted that although the constitutive and
constitutive-collective recognition theories draw support from scholars,
this could not be said to be as widespread as scholarly support for the
135
declaratory theory.
132. Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, supra note 129, at
1486–87 (emphasis added).
133. Brownlie, for example, has correctly noted that “[r]ecognition, as a public act of state, is
an optional and political act and there is no legal duty in this regard.” BROWNLIE, supra note 26,
at 89–90.
134. Crawford, for example, has written: “But overall the international approach to the
dissolution of Yugoslavia, unhappy as it has been, does not support the constitutive theory, still
less demand that we adopt it as a general matter.” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 25.
135. In relation to the constitutive theory, see OPPENHEIM, supra note 73, at 125–26; GEORG
JELLINEK, ALLEGMEINE STAATSLEHRE, 273 (5th ed. 1928); Roth, supra note 73, at 128; GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (3d. ed. 1957–76); BERNARD R. BOT,
NONRECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 17–19 (A. W. Sijthoff ed., 1968); SATYAVRATA R.
PATEL, RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS 119–22 (N. M. Tripathi ed., 1959); JAN H. W.
VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 578–90 (Sijthoff ed., 1968–76);
Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding Race Strategies from International Legal History: The Self-
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X. PRE-EMINENCE OF THE DECLARATORY RECOGNITION THEORY
AND THE MODERN CRITERIA FOR STATEHOOD
Once the declaratory recognition theory is accepted, however, the
modern criteria for statehood must be considered, because there are
numerous examples of effective territorial entities (i.e., entities that
have satisfied the five criteria enumerated above) that have been denied
statehood by the international community of states. In other words,
international forums such as the Security Council and General
Assembly have, on certain occasions, refused to accord the title of
“state” to territorial entities that satisfy the five criteria for statehood
136
based on effectiveness discussed above. Given that the declaratory
recognition theory is accepted as generally correct, it follows that some
other factor must be operating to prevent otherwise effective territorial
entities from attaining the title of “state,” not to mention recognition as
a state.
137
This other factor is a breach of peremptory norms (jus cogens).
Where a breach of peremptory norms occurs during a putative state’s
formative process, statehood will be legally denied.138 Although
scholars have postulated a variety of peremptory norms, the most
pertinent in the context of state creation are the interconnected norms of
self-determination and the prohibition on the illegal use of force.139 Put
simply, an effective secessionist entity will be denied statehood if it
breaches these peremptory norms during its formative process.140
Generally, these norms might be summarized as requiring that a people
(defined as a nationally-based sub-state group) may not establish a new
executing Treaty Doctrine and the Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 1125–
27 (2000); Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: the
Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT’L L. 17 (1968); see Derry J. Devine,
Rhodesia Since the Unilateral Declaration of Independence, 1 ACTA JURIDICA 63, 90–145
(1973); Derry J. Devine, Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of International Concern – A
Qualification, 2 COMP. & INT’L L. J. S. AFR. 454, 456 (1969); In relation to the constitutivecollective theory, see KELSEN, supra note 74, at 79; Dugard, supra note 32, at 79.
136. Rhodesia’s non-recognition from 1965 to 1980, which arguably breached the
peremptory norm of the right of peoples to self-determination, is a good example. Dugard, supra
note 32, at 90; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 130–31; CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 128–31; James E. S
Fawcett, Security Council Resolutions on Rhodesia, 41 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L.112 (1965–1966);
CHRISTIAN HILLGRUBER, Die Aufnahme Neuer Staaten in die Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft: das
Völkerrechtliche Institut der Annerkennung von Neustaaten in der Praxis des 19 und 20
Jahrhunderts 601 (1998).
137. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 107; Duursma, supra note 44, at 127–32; RAIČ, supra note
5, at 156–57.
138. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 128; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 156–57.
139. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 129–32; Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial
Secession and the Use of Force: Effect on Claims to Statehood in International Law, 28 CONN. J.
INT’L L. 197 (2013).
140. Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Use of Force, supra note 139, at 240.
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state where the group has not previously been systematically denied
their right to internal self-determination by the existing state. This
requirement will be satisfied in a colonial context where the territory
concerned is geographically, ethnically and culturally distinctive from
141
the metropolitan power, as enumerated in Resolution 1541
and
142
general state practice. In the non-colonial context, guidance as to the
circumstances where internal self-determination might be denied is
provided by Principle 5, paragraph 7 of the Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations
and Article 1 of the Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth
143
Anniversary of the United Nations. The latter provides that the UN
will, inter alia:
[c]ontinue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples,
taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial
or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, and
recognize the right of peoples to take legitimate action in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize their
inalienable right to self-determination. This shall not be construed
as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any
144
kind.

When subjected to an a contrario reading, the foregoing indicates
that only those states which represent their population “without
distinction of any kind” are entitled to guarantees with respect to their
141. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) [hereinafter Declaration on the
Granting of Independence].
142. See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 141; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles
of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance With the Charter of the United Nations, (Oct. 24, 1970), especially, Principle 5
paragraphs 2(b) and 6; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 79; Also state practice in
terms of physical acts and omissions (successful instances of decolonization).
143. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
50/6, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/50/6 (Oct. 24, 1995). For an extended analysis of
this declaration and its legal effects, see Glen Anderson, Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession in
International Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions: Textual Content and Legal
Effects, 41 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 345 (2013).
144. G.A. Res. 50/6, supra note 144, at 2 (emphasis added).
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“territorial integrity or political unity” and that accordingly, secession
will only be permissible under certain strictly circumscribed
circumstances.145 However UNC secessionist case studies such as
Bangladesh, the TRNC, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Kosovo
collectively indicate that only when human rights violations by the
existing state are in extremis (ethnic cleansing, mass killings and
genocide) as opposed to in moderato (political, cultural and racial
discrimination) will a right to secession be perfected in international
146
customary law. It is thus under these conditions that force can be
applied by a non-colonial secessionist group against the existing state
without breaching the interconnected peremptory norms of self147
determination and the prohibition on the illegal use of force.
When the requirements based on effectiveness are satisfied and the
peremptory norms of self-determination and the prohibition on the
illegal use of force are not violated, however, a secessionist state can be
said to legally exist. The outcome of secession can thus be distinguished
from the process at this point.
XI. IS IRREDENTISM SECESSION?
According to one school of thought, irredentism should be
included within the definition of secession,148 whilst according to
145. Id.
146. Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Use of Force: Effect on Claims to Statehood
in International Law, supra note 139, at 232; Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession in International
Law and Declaratory General Assembly Resolutions, supra note 143, at 394–95.
147. It is generally accepted that Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter apply only to states
and not “peoples” or sub-state groups. For arguments to this effect, see Unilateral Non-Colonial
Secession and the Use of Force, supra note 139, 215–16; John Dugard, The Organisation of
African Unity and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a Justification for the
Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism, 16 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 157, 172 (1967);
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 85–86 (4th ed. 2005); Rodney Pails,
Self-Determination, the Use of Force and International Law, 20(1) U. TASMANIA L. REV. 70, 78–
79 (2001); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Towards Legal Aspects of the Use of
Force, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 449 (Antonio Cassese ed.,
1986); Frank Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples
and Nations as a Prerequisite for Peace, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 49, 101 (1990–1991).
148. Karin von Hippel, The Resurgence of Nationalism and Its International Implications,
17(4) THE WASH. Q. 185, 185–86 (1994); Christine Haverland, Secession, in IV ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUB. INT’L L. 354 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000); RAIČ, supra note 5, at 308; ANA S.
TRBOVICH, A LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF YUGOSLAVIA’S DISINTEGRATION 23 (2008); Julie Dahlitz,
Introduction, in SECESSION AND INT’L L. 6 (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003); Thio has endorsed verbatim
the definition provided by Haverland: Li-Ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia
and Pacific Regions, in SECESSION: INT’L L. PERSPECTIVES 297 (Marcelo G Kohen ed., 2006);
KOHEN, supra note 28, at 3; Pfirter and Napolitano, supra note 32, at 375; BARBARA GOODWIN,
USING POLITICAL IDEAS 277 (5th ed. 2007); Ouguergouz endorses the definition of secession
postulated by Haverland: Fatsah Ouguergouz, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: A COMPREHENSIVE AGENDA FOR HUMAN DIGNITY AND SUSTAINABLE
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another school, it should not.149 It is therefore necessary to determine
whether irredentism should be included within the definition of
secession.
The etymology of “irredentism” lies in the Italian term
150
“irredenta,” meaning “unredeemed.” The Oxford English Dictionary
corresponds with this meaning, defining an “irredentist” as “an adherent
of the party which advocates the recovery and union to Italy of all
151
Italian speaking districts now subject to other countries.”
In the
context of international law and relations, irredentism thus refers to the
amalgamation of an existing state’s territory (state A), in whole or part,
152
with another existing state (state B). The process of amalgamation can
be divided into four types:
Type 1: Exogenous to “state A,” taking the form of forcible
annexation by “state B,” of all of “state A’s” territory;
Type 2: Exogenous to “state A,” taking the form of forcible
DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 233 (2003); Milena Sterio, On the Right to External Self-Determination:
“Selfistans”, Secession and the Great Powers’ Rule, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 142 (2010); MILENA
STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: “SELFISTANS”,
SECESSION AND THE RULE OF GREAT POWERS 24 (2013).
149. Simon Carney, Self-Government and Secession: The Case of Nations 5(4) J. OF POL.
PHIL. 353 (1997); Michael Hechter, The Dynamics of Secession, 35 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 267
(1992); HERACLIDES, supra note 3, at 1; CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 375; Radan, supra note 6,
at 18; PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCESSION TO INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 18 (2007);
Georges Abi-Saab, Conclusion, in SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 473
(Marcelo G Kohen ed., 2006); Coppieters, supra note 28, at 4; Christian Tomuschat, Secession
and Self-Determination, in SECESSION: INT’L L. PERSP. 44 (Marcelo G Kohen ed., 2006); VIVA
ONA BARTKUS, THE DYNAMIC OF SECESSION 3 (1999); Buchanan, supra note 5; Debra A.
Valentine, The Logic of Secession, 89 YALE L. J. 802 (1980); Daryl J. Glaser, The Right to
Secession: An Antisecessionist Defence, 51 POL. STUD. 369, 371 (2003); Nolte, supra note 26, at
65; WELHENGAMA, supra note 32, at 212–14; Bishai, supra note 32, at 33; GUIBERNAU
MONTSERRAT, THE IDENTITY OF NATIONS 54 (2007); Bridget L. Coggins, Secession,
RECOGNITION AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF STATEHOOD 54 (Unpublished PhD
dissertation, Graduate School of the Ohio State University, 2006); Zhu and Blachford, supra note
32, at 46; Jaroslav Tir, Keeping the Peace after Secession: Territorial Conflicts Between Rump
and Secessionist States, 49 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 713, 714–15 (2005); Jaroslav Tir, Dividing
Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions, 42 J. OF PEACE
RES. 545 (2005).
150. The term was used by the Associazione pro Italia irredenta to connote the incorporation
of the large Italian speaking communities of Trentino, Istria, Trieste and Tyrol into newly unified
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY,
Italy.
See
Irredentist,
ONLINE
http://www.etymonline.om/index.php?search=irredentist&searchmode=term; Laura Murray,
Examining Irredentism, 45 J. INT’L AFF. 648 (1992); Gerlinde Raub, Irredentism, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. 1451 (1995); James Mayall, Nationalism and the International
Order, 14 MILLENNIUM 148 (1985); Von Hippel, supra note 148, at 185; David Carment and
Patrick James, Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Crisis-Based
Assessment of Irredentism, 39 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 84 (1995); DAVID CARMENT, ET AL., WHO
INTERVENES? ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERSTATE CRISIS 12 (2006).
151. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 488 (1933).
152. See Mayall, supra note 150, at 148. For a non-exhaustive list of potential irredentist
claims, see DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 281 (1985).
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annexation of part of “state A’s” territory;
Type 3: Endogenous to “state A,” taking the form of complete
amalgamation between “state A” and “state B”;
Type 4: Endogenous to part of “state A,” taking the form of a
153
secession from “state A,” followed by amalgamation with “state B.”
With regard to type 1 and 2 irredentism, “state B” is forcefully
pursuing the annexation of “state A’s” territory. Thus, during the
process of annexation, secession, in the form of an endogenously
motivated withdrawal, does not occur. With regard to type 3
irredentism, although “state A” consents to and therefore exerts control
over the amalgamation process, secession in the form of an
endogenously motivated withdrawal does not occur. With regard to type
4 irredentism, however, prior to amalgamation occurring, an
endogenously motivated secession does occur. Bearing these remarks in
mind, it can now be determined whether irredentism should be included
within the definition of secession.
If the words “secession” and “irredentism” are not used
interchangeably, as indeed they do not appear to be, it follows that there
must be a point of distinction. Bearing in mind the etymological origins
of the two words, it is submitted that the point of distinction is that
secession refers to an endogenously motivated “withdrawal,” whereas
irredentism essentially connotes an endogenously or exogenously
motivated “amalgamation.” Secession and irredentism, although related
phenomena, are thus not identical. It follows that irredentism should not
be included within the definition of secession.
Some further points, however, might be made with regard to
exogenous and endogenous irredentism. First, it is clear that under
contemporary international law, type 1 and 2 exogenous irredentism
qualifies as illegal occupation. Under such circumstances, the original
sovereignty of the forcibly annexed territory is held to subsist, at least in
154
legal terms, with the original titleholder.
In August 1991, for
example, Iraq invaded Kuwait under the loose banner of historical
irredentism, citing the fact that Kuwait was once part of the Ottoman
province of Basra.155 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, however, was
viewed by the international community as categorically illegal, and
153. However, it should be noted though, that some definitions narrow irredentist movements
to only the exogenous variant, or a situation of annexation. See THOMAS AMBROSIO,
IRREDENTISM, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 2 (2001); Hedva Ben-Israel,
IRREDENTISM AND NATIONAL POLITICS 24 (Naomi Chazan ed., 1991).
154. SC Res 661 implemented a blockade of Iraq, and SC Res 674 authorized states
cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary measures to uphold and implement the blockade.
See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 169–70 (2d ed.
2012).
155. See Marc Weller, IRAQ AND THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18–19 (2010).
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collective military action was eventually authorized under Chapter VII
156
of the UN Charter to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. From these
facts, it can be reasonably inferred that the removal of an illegal foreign
occupying force from part of a state’s territory does not constitute
secession, but instead, liberation, or reversion to lawful sovereign
157
authority.
Second, with regard to type IV endogenous irredentism, it must be
explained why such a turn of events does not qualify as secession, given
that for at least a brief point in time, a new state has been created. The
answer lays in the fact that irredentism, like secession, is both a process
and an outcome. During the process of type IV endogenous irredentism,
a new state may be temporarily created, but this is not the end point of
the process. Type IV endogenous irredentism only occurs as an outcome
with the subsequent amalgamation of that territory with an already
existing state. Accordingly, in a conceptual sense, type IV endogenous
irredentism and secession are not identical concepts, even though
secession may form one part of the type IV endogenous irredentism
process.158
Before concluding, a final issue beckons consideration, namely,
whether irredentism can be applied to the creation of a new state
159
throughout part of the territory of two or more existing states. Given
that the process of state creation in this context is likely to consist of
two or more simultaneous or near simultaneous endogenously
motivated withdrawals from existing states, it is submitted that such a
turn of events is more correctly described as secession rather than
160
irredentism.
XII. IS DECOLONIZATION SECESSION?
According to one school of thought, the withdrawal of colonial
161
territories should be included within the definition of secession,
156. SC Res 661 implemented a blockade of Iraq, and SC Res 674 authorized states
cooperating with Kuwait to use all necessary measures to uphold and implement the blockade.
See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 169–70 (2012).
157. Id. at 151; CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 698; RAIČ, supra note 5, at 308.
158. HOROWITZ, supra note 152, at 281–82.
159. Although the author is unaware of any historical examples of such phenomena, they
nonetheless remain a theoretical possibility and must therefore be considered. One possibility for
the future may be the rise of Kurdistan, drawing upon the territory of current day Iraq and Turkey.
160. Benyamin Neuberger, Irredentism and Politics in Africa, in IRREDENTISM AND NAT’L
POL. 97 (Naomi Chazan ed., 1991).
161. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 330, 375; Pavković & Radan, supra note 6, at 18; Peter
Radan, Secessionist Referenda in International Law and Domestic Law, 18 NATIONALISM &
ETHNIC POL. 9 (2012) [hereinafter Radan, Secessionist Referenda]; Malcolm N. Shaw, The Role
of Recognition and Non-Recognition with Respect to Secession: Notes on Some Relevant Issues,
in SECESSION AND INT’L L.: CONFLICT AVOIDANCE – REGIONAL APPRAISALS 245 (Julie Dahlitz
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162

whilst according to another, it should not.
Before proceeding to
analyse the validity of these respective positions, however, it is first
necessary to define the terms “metropolitan power” and “colonial
territory.”
The test for determining the difference between a metropolitan
163
power and colonial territory is contained within Resolution 1541,
adopted by the General Assembly just one day after the 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
164
Peoples. Principle IV of Resolution 1541 provides: “Prima facie there
is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is
geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from
165
the country administering it.”
Principle V of the same Resolution continues:
Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of
geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctiveness of a territory
exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration.
These additional elements may be, inter alia, of an administrative,
political juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the
relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory
ed. 2003); Haverland, supra note 148, at 354–55; Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination and
Indigenous Peoples: Objection and Responses, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION 39, 52–54 (Pekka Aiko & Martin Scheinin eds.,
2000); THOMAS D. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES 181 (1997);
Ouguergouz, supra note 148, at 235; see also INGRID DETTER DE LUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 15 (2d ed. 1987); Przetacznik, supra note 147, at 103; HANNA
BOKOR-SZEGÖ, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 53 (1978).
162. Hechter, supra note 149, at 267; HERACLIDES, supra note 4, at 1; Thomas M Franck et
al., The Territorial Integrity of Quebec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty, in SELFDETERMINATION IN INT’L LAW: QUEBEC AND LESSONS LEARNED 283 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed.,
2000); Rosalyn Higgins, Self-Determination and Secession, in SECESSION AND INT’L LAW:
CONFLICT AVOIDANCE–REGIONAL APPRAISALS 35 (Julie Dahlitz ed., 2003); Aleksandar
Pavković, Introduction, in ON THE WAY TO STATEHOOD: SECESSION AND GLOBALISATION 1, 2–
3 (Aleksandar Pavković and Peter Radan eds., 2008); see also Pavković and Radan, supra note 6,
at 2; Nolte, supra note 26, at 65; Jaroslav Tir, Keeping the Peace After Secession: Territorial
Conflicts Between Rump and Secessionist States, 49 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 713, 714 (2005);
KOHEN, supra note 28, at 3; Dahlitz, supra note 148, at 6–7; Dumberry, supra note 149, at 19;
Trbovich, supra note 148, at 1; Bishai, supra note 32, at 33; REIN MÜLLERSON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, RIGHTS AND POLITICS: DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS 72 (1994);
WELHENGAMA, supra note 32, at 260–61; Anna Michalska, Rights of Peoples to SelfDetermination in International Law, in ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 71, 81 (William
Twining ed., 1990); Thomas D. Grant, Extending Decolonization: How the United Nations Might
Have Addressed Kosovo, 28 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 9, 25–26 (1999); Urs W. Saxer, The
Transformation of the Soviet Union: From a Socialist Federation to a Commonwealth of
Independent States, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 581, 636 (1992); GOODWIN, supra note
148, at 264, 277.
163. Declaration on the Granting of Independence, supra note 141.
164. Id.
165. Id. Principle IV.
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concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a
position or status of subordination, they support the presumption
that there is an obligation to transmit information under Article 73e
166
of the Charter.

Thus, where a territory is “geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it” the
territory concerned is, prima facie, of a colonial nature. The use of the
word “administering” is significant as it implies an inherently unequal
relationship between the metropolitan power and the colonial territory.
Central to this unequal relationship is that the metropolitan power
enjoys control, by virtue of its sovereign authority, over the colonial
territory. Principle V explicitly builds upon the import of Principle IV,
providing that once a prima facie “case of geographical and ethnical or
cultural distinctiveness of a territory exists, other elements may then be
167
brought into consideration.”
These elements may be of an
168
“administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical nature.” If
these elements “affect the relationship between the metropolitan State
and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the
latter in a position or status of subordination” it can be safely assumed
169
that the territory concerned is of a colonial nature.
In order to determine whether decolonization—the independence
either by consensual or unilateral withdrawal—of a colonial territory
from a metropolitan power should be included within the definition of
secession, it is necessary to recall the centrality of sovereignty to the
secession process as highlighted previously. Bearing this in mind, it
must be determined whether a metropolitan power possesses
sovereignty throughout its colonial territories.
Sureda, when considering this question, has asserted that:
The idea of trust not being acceptable, the presence of the
metropolis in its colonies has gradually been considered illegal
unless confirmed by an act of self-determination. This seems to
indicate that, within the context of colonialism, self-determination
has become a peremptory norm of International Law whereby a
170
state’s title to a territory having colonial status is void.

According to this position the combined effect of Chapter XI of
166. Id. Principle V.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1541(XV) (Dec. 15, 1960).
170. A RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: A STUDY
OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 353 (1973).
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171

the UN Charter, Resolution 1541 and the Declaration on the Granting
172
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples is to displace or
render “void” the metropolitan power’s sovereignty over its colonial
territories.
The view propounded by Sureda, however, is an aberrant one, and
is not reflected in legal doctrine. In the Rights of Passage Case
173
(Portugal v India), for example, the ICJ held by a majority of 11-4
that Portugal, in 1954, had a right of passage with respect to private
persons, civil officials and goods in general over Indian territory
174
surrounding its enclaved territories, Dadra and Nagar-Aveli. By so
ruling, the ICJ effectively accepted that Portugal had sovereignty
throughout its colonial enclaves. This position was affirmed by the
175
Western Sahara Case, where the ICJ held that the request before it,
relating to the status of a non-self-governing territory, did not relate to
176
“existing territorial rights or sovereignty over territory.” The ICJ thus
held that Spain’s sovereignty throughout Western Sahara was not in
question, but rather its transfer to another state (new or already existing)
177
sometime in the future. Later ICJ cases, such as Land and Maritime
178
Boundaries Between Cameroon and Nigeria and Case Concerning
179
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia)
confirmed this
position.
The correct view then is that metropolitan powers possess
sovereignty throughout their colonial territories, although international
law imposes qualifications on the continuing exercise of this
sovereignty. Crawford has summarized the position as follows:
The view that sovereignty over a non-self-governing territory
remains with the administering State can be accepted only with
reservations. That State has accepted far reaching obligations with
respect to such territories, obligations not substantially different from
those that were accepted by States administering Trust Territories
171. Principles Which Should Guide Members in Determining Whether or Not An Obligation
Exists to Transmit the Information Called For Under Article 73e of The Charter, G.A. Res. 1541
(XV), (Dec. 15, 1960).
172. Declaration on the Granting of Independence, supra note 141.
173. Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits,
1960 I.C.J 6 (Apr. 12).
174. Id. at 39; see generally FRANK E. KRENZ, INTERNATIONAL ENCLAVES AND RIGHTS OF
PASSAGE (1961); CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 614.
175. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
176. Id. at 28; CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 615.
177. See B.O. Okere, The Western Sahara Case, 28 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 296 (1979).
178. Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria),
Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. 275.
179. Case concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namb,), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J.
1045 (Dec. 13).
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under Chapter XII. It is true that the Charter contemplates a greater
measure of international supervision of Trust Territories, but even
with respect to supervision the two regimes tended to be conflated by
subsequent Assembly action. Nonetheless, certain distinctions
remained, at least in theory: for example, the plea of domestic
jurisdiction was in principle irrelevant to Trust Territories, but was
capable of applying to Chapter XI territories, however little that plea
may have prevailed in practice. Administering States have more
freedom with respect to termination of Non-Self-Governing status
than with respect to termination of Trusteeship. And the General
Assembly has never claimed or exercised a power to revoke or
declare forfeit a State’s title to administer a Non-Self-Governing
territory: the most it has done is call upon States to terminate such
180
status by granting independence.

Stricto sensu colonial territories should thus be classified as
constituent parts of the metropolitan power. This conclusion inexorably
flows from the very nature of colonisation: a metropolitan power
administers (exercises control over) another subordinate territory. Such
subordination is the very discrimen of colonisation and can only occur if
the administered territory is without its own sovereignty. Given this
fact, it is entirely appropriate to refer to instances of “decolonization”,
whereby there is the withdrawal of sovereignty from the metropolitan
power and the creation of a new state, as secession.
This interpretation is reflected by the domestic legal structures of
the French, Portuguese and British empires. In 1946, for example, the
French Fourth Republic was established, which under Article 60 created
the French Union, connecting French colonial territories to Paris by a
loose federation. This integration—which was achieved without the
consultation of the citizens concerned and enshrined the continued
economic and political subordination of overseas territories to Pairs—
explicitly confirmed France’s underlying sovereignty throughout its
181
overseas territories. The 1958 French Fifth Republic retained this
integrationist structure and remains in force today.
Similarly, the Portuguese colonial empire was integrated into a
wider multi-continental Portugal in 1951 by amendment to the 1933
Portuguese Constitution under title 7, entitled On the Portuguese
Overseas. This integration, which was achieved without the
consultation of the citizens, concerned and enshrined the continued
180. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 613–14.
181. The validity of the integration is questionable in international law. See Robert Aldrich
and John Connell, France’s Overseas Frontier: Départements et Territoires d’ Outre-Mer 62–63
(1992); David A Chappell, The Noumea Accord: Decolonization Without Independence in New
Caledonia? 72 PAC. AFF. 374 (1999).
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economic and political subordination of overseas territories to Lisbon,
and explicitly confirmed Portugal’s underlying sovereignty throughout
182
its overseas territories.
Although Britain did not adopt the same integrationist approach to
its colonial empire, it nonetheless emphasized its underlying
sovereignty throughout its colonial territories, even in situations where
183
self-government had been granted by way of devolution.
When
184
considering the case of Madizimbamuto v Lardner-Burke
in the
context of Southern Rhodesia, for example, the Privy Council held:
If the Queen in the Parliament of the United Kingdom was
Sovereign in Southern Rhodesia in 1965, there can be no doubt that
the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 and the Order in Council made
under it were of full effect there. Several of the learned judges have
held that Sovereignty was divided between the United Kingdom and
Southern Rhodesia. Their Lordships cannot agree. So far as they are
aware it has never been doubted that, when a colony is acquired or
annexed, following conquest or settlement, the Sovereignty of the
United Kingdom Parliament extends to the colony, and its powers
over that colony are the same as its powers in the United Kingdom.
So, in 1923, full Sovereignty over the annexed territory of Southern
Rhodesia was acquired. That Sovereignty was not diminished by the
limited grant of self-government which was then made. It was
necessary to pass the Statute of Westminster, 1931, in order to
confer independence and Sovereignty on the Six Dominions therein
185
mentioned, but Southern Rhodesia was not included.

The Privy Council later expounded specifically in relation to the
convention that the British Parliament would not legislate on matters
within the competence of the Legislative Assembly of Southern
Rhodesia:
The learned judges refer to a statement of the United Kingdom
Government in 1961, already quoted, setting out the convention that
the Parliament of the United Kingdom does not legislate without the
182. Again, the validity of the integration is questionable in international law. See generally
2 ANTONIO HENRIQUE DE OLIVEIRA MARQUES, HISTORY OF PORTUGAL: FROM EMPIRE TO
CORPORATE STATE 227, 229 (2nd ed., 1976); NEIL BRUCE, PORTUGAL OVERSEAS 57–58 (1975);
F.C.C. EGERTON, SALAZAR: REBUILDER OF PORTUGAL 262 (1943); Patricia Wohlgemuth, The
Portuguese Territories and the United Nations, in 545 INT’L CONCILIATION 3 (1963); Inis L.
Claude, Jr., Domestic Jurisdiction and Colonialism, in NEW STATES AND THE MODERN WORLD
130–32 (Martin Kilson ed., 1975).
183. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 351.
184. Madizimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645. See generally H.H. Marshall, The
Legal Effects of U. D. I. (Based on Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke), 17 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
1022 (1968); CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 351, 369.
185. Madizimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke, supra note 184, at 722.
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consent of the Government of Southern Rhodesia on matters within
the competence of the Legislative Assembly. That was a very
important convention but it had no legal effect in limiting the legal
power [plenary legislative competence] of Parliament.
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United
Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral,
political and other reasons against doing them are so strong that
most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did
these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power of
Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any of them
186
the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.

The foregoing indicates that Britain maintained sovereignty
throughout its colonial territories, which despite not being exercised to
the fullest extent by convention, was nonetheless an ever-present legal
potentiality.
It follows that colonial territories were subject to the overarching
sovereignty of their metropolitan power. Once this premise is accepted,
it emerges that any withdrawal of this sovereignty to create a new state
is secession.
The foregoing discussion has significantly clarified the meaning of
secession in the context of international law and relations. Some further
definitional issues, however, require examination if a comprehensive
legal definition of secession is to be developed—namely, whether a
formal declaration of independence is necessary for secession, and
whether secession is synonymous with dissolution, devolution and
autonomy.
XIII. IS A FORMAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE SECESSION?
In order to assess the validity of this requirement, it is necessary to
187
assess the function of a formal declaration of independence. Crawford
has suggested that a declaration of independence is “commonly used to
refer to the unilateral act by which a group declares that it is seceding
and forming a new state. Although usually declaratory in form, a
188
unilateral declaration of independence is not a self-executing act.”
Crawford therefore asserts that a formal declaration of
independence antedates the outcome of secession and is confined to the
unilateral secession process. It is equally possible, however, that a
186. Id. at 722–23.
187. Heraclides has included a formal declaration of independence within his definition of
secession. See HERACLIDES, supra note 4, at 1.
188. James Crawford, State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession,
Secession, 69 BRIT. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 85, 86 (1998).
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formal declaration of independence may coincide with the outcome of
secession and thus statehood, thereby signifying, in the opinion of the
withdrawing territory, its sovereign and independent status. This may be
especially the case where the territory has withdrawn via a
constitutional or politically negotiated secession process, although it
may still be applicable to the unilateral secession process.
With regard to the first type of declaration, namely, antedating the
outcome of secession, it is clear that the announcement is no more than
a declaration of intent; that is, the withdrawing territory is publicly
announcing its intention to pursue the process of secession, and
therefore, could not be viewed as decisive to the outcome itself.
With regard to the second type of declaration, namely, coinciding
with the outcome of secession, it must be determined, by reference to
the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness and compliance with
peremptory norms, whether a formal declaration of independence is
legally necessary. Recall that Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Right and Duties of States provides that “[t]he state
as a person on international law should possess the following
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”189
Hence, no indication is provided within the criteria for statehood
based on effectiveness that a formal declaration of independence is
necessary for the creation of a new state. Regarding the criteria for
statehood based on compliance with peremptory norms, it is clear that
the only restrictions imposed upon putative secessionist states are that
they are not born of peremptory norm violations. Should a declaration
of independence be issued by a putative secessionist state which has
breached a peremptory norm during its formative process, as indicated
190
by the Kosovo Advisory Opinion,
such a declaration would be
unlawful. It emerges then that although a formal declaration of
independence might be politically useful for secession, it is legally
unnecessary.

189. Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19,
art. 1(d).
190. Unilateral Declaration of Independence, supra note 142, ¶ 81; Jure Vidmar,
Conceptualizing Declarations of Independence and International Law, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 153,
24 (2012); Besfort Rrecaj, A Contemporary Interpretation of the Principles of Sovereignty,
Territorial Integrity and Self-Determination, and the Kosovo Conundrum, in KOSOVO: A
PRECEDENT? THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE ADVISORY OPINION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATEHOOD, SELF-DETERMINATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 130–31 (James
Summers ed., 2011); Gulara Guliyeva, Kosovo’s Independence: Re-Examining the Principles
Established by the EC Badinter Commission in Light of the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, in KOSOVO:
A PRECENT? 279 (2011).
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XIV. IS DISSOLUTION SECESSION?
The etymology of “dissolution” lies in the Latin term “dissolutus”
191
meaning “to loosen up” or “break apart.”
The Oxford English
Dictionary concomitantly defines “dissolution” as “disintegration” and
192
the “undoing of . . . bond[s].” In the context of international law and
relations, the term is used to denote the legal extinction, as opposed to
continuity, of the existing state, after one or more secessions have taken
place. As such, dissolution describes an outcome that crystallizes after
one or more secessions have occurred. Crawford, in this connection, has
observed:
It is necessary to distinguish unilateral secession of part of a State
and the outright dissolution of the predecessor State as a whole. In
the latter case there is, by definition, no predecessor State
continuing in existence. But the distinction between dissolution of a
State and unilateral secession of part of a State may be difficult to
draw in particular cases. The dissolution of a State may be initially
triggered by the secession or attempted secession of one part of that
State. If the process goes beyond that and involves a general
withdrawal of all or most of the territories concerned, and no
substantial central or federal component remains behind, it may be
193
evident that the predecessor State as a whole has ceased to exist.

Craven, substituting the term “dismemberment” for “dissolution”
has similarly observed:
Dismemberment . . . is merely descriptive of a form of extinction
following the disassociation [secession] of various territorial units.
As such, it can only really be attributed to a situation ex post facto
once the lack of continuity of the [existing] State has been finally
194
determined.

Or, as Lalonde has noted: “[t]he principal distinction between
dissolution and secession lies in the fact that in a case of dissolution
there is no ‘parent’ state entitled to insist on respect for its territorial
195
integrity.”
191. Dissolve,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=dissolve&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited Feb. 18,
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
2013);
Dissolute
ONLINE
http://www.etymonline.com/indexindex.php?term=dissolute&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
192. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 513 (2d ed. 1989).
193. Bayefsky, supra note 162, at 42.
194. Matthew C. R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on
Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. INT’L L. 333, 369 (1995).
195. SUZANNE LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN A CONFLICTING WORLD: THE
ROLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS 221 (2002). For further discussion of the distinction between secession
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Thus, one or more secessions from an existing state may, after this
process or processes are complete, result either in (1) the creation of a
new state or states; or (2) the creation of a new state or states, and, if the
existing state is rendered extinct, also constitute a situation of
dissolution. Hence, although secession and dissolution are related
196
phenomena, they are not, strictly speaking, synonymous.
Most secessions do not result in the existing state’s dissolution, as
international law preferences the continuity of states even if they are
197
drastically diminished in terms of territory, population and resources.
A good illustration of this preference occurred in 1991 when, following
the secession of ten member republics, the continuity of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—with the new name “Russian
Federation”—was upheld by the UN and without protest from other
198
states. As Shaw has observed:
[D]espite the approach taken in December 1991 CIS documentation
proclaiming the end of the USSR in terms which in law would
suggest dissolution or dismemberment of that entity thus logically
precluding continuity, it is clear from all the circumstances that this
was an essentially political statement not taken by either the parties
themselves or by third States as constituting a proclamation of
dissolution preventing claims by Russia of continuity. On the
and dissolution, see Rodoljub Etinski, Has the SFR of Yugoslavia Ceased to Exist as a Subject of
International Law, in INT’L L. AND THE CHANGED YUGOSLAVA 289 (Radovan Petkovic ed.,
1995), especially the remarks by Sir Francis Vallet at 29.
196. Crawford has observed that, “[it] is true that the distinction between dismemberment and
a series of secessions may be in the eyes of the beholder . . . .” CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 714.
197. CRAWFORD, supra 4, at 93, 189; Milenko Kreća, Succession and the Continuity of
Yugoslavia, 33 JUGOSLOVENSKA REVIJA ZA MEDUNARODNO PRAVO 181 (1992).
198. On 24 December, for example, the Russian Permanent Member to the UN directed a
letter to the UN Secretary General from the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin,
stating, inter alia, “the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United
Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and organizations of the United
Nations system is being continued by the Russian Federation (RSFSR) with the support of the
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. In this connection, I request that the name
“Russian Federation” should be used in the United Nations in place of the name [USSR]. The
Russian Federation maintains full responsibility for all the rights and obligations of the USSR
under the Charter of the United Nations, including financial obligations.” quoted in CRAWFORD,
supra note 4, at 677. A former Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation has written that
“Russia, as the continuing State of the USSR, intends to promote in every possible way the
strengthening of the United Nations.” Andrei Kozyrev, Russia: A Chance for Survival, 71
FOREIGN AFF. 11 (1992); see generally, Yehuda Z. Blum, Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union’s
Seat at the United Nations 3 EUR. J. INT’L L. 361 (1992); David O. Lloyd, Succession, Secession,
and State Membership in the United Nations, 26 N.Y.U. J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 777 (1994);
Müllerson, supra note 58, at 477; In another context, Müllerson, after extensive analysis, has
written that “Russia really does continue the existence of the Soviet Union, albeit with diminished
borders and with a diminished population” (Rein Müllerson, Law and Politics in Succession of
States: International Law on Succession of States, in DISSOLUTION, CONTINUATION AND
SUCCESSION IN EASTERN EUROPE, 11 (Brigitte Stern ed., 1998).
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contrary, Russia’s continuity was asserted and supported by all
199
parties.

Accordingly, only in the very rare circumstances where one or
more secessions result in no semblance of the existing state will
dissolution also have occurred.
One example of the foregoing is the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). From 1992 onwards, despite the
Belgrade government adducing evidence that the SFRY continued to
exist, the international community increasingly held that the SFRY was
extinct. In November 1991, for example, Opinion No. 1 of the
200
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia
201
indicated that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution. In May 1992,
the Security Council in Resolution 757 confirmed this interpretation,
noting that “the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the
former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations
202
has not been generally accepted.” In July 1992, Opinion No. 8 of the
203
Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia,
noting a European Council Declaration and Resolution 757, asserted
204
that “the SFRY no longer exists.”
In September of the same year, the
Security Council in Resolution 777 echoed this view, asserting that “the
state formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
205
has ceased to exist.” The same Resolution noted that “the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic
206
of Yugoslavia in the United Nations.” This position was maintained
by later Security Council resolutions such as, inter alia, Resolution

199. Malcolm N. Shaw, State Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 34, 49–50
(1994).
200. Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1494–96 (1992).
201. It should be noted, however, that to speak of dissolution as a process is problematic.
Craven, for example, has correctly observed that “[i]f the issue is simply whether or not a State
continues to exist, it makes no sense to speak of dismemberment as a process.” Craven, The
European Community Arbitration, supra note 194, at 369; see generally regarding Opinion No. 1,
CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 710; RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 89, at
204–05.
202. S.C. Res. 757, Mandatory Sanctions Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (May 30, 1992).
203. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, supra note 200, at 1521–23.
204. Id. at 1521; see generally CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 710; RADAN, THE BREAK-UP OF
YUGOSLAVIA, supra note 89, at 205–07.
205. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (Sept. 16, 1992).
206. Id.
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207

1022.
The General Assembly took a less decisive view, but
nonetheless maintained that:
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
cannot continue automatically the membership of the former
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations; and
therefore decides that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United
Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the General
208
Assembly.

The question might be asked, therefore, why the USSR was held to
continue as a state, but the SFRY was not? Aside from political
209
concerns,
there was one principal legal reason, namely, that the
SFRY—unlike the USSR—did not form the majority of territory and
population of the original state. This fact, more than any other, militated
against the claim that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
210
Montenegro) essentially represented the continuation of the SFRY. A
priori, it also militated against the claim that the SFRY had experienced
multiple secessions without also experiencing dissolution.
One possible exception to this statement of general principle,
however, was the secession and dissolution of the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic (CSFR), which was achieved by voluntary agreement
on 31 December 1992 and replaced by two new states: the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. As Crawford has suggested, the fact that the
majority of territory, population and economic resources of the former
CSFR were concentrated in the Czech Republic might have indicated
that this was not a case of secession and dissolution, but instead only
211
secession.
In conclusion it can be said that secession and dissolution,
although related phenomena, are not synonymous. Dissolution only
occurs after one or more secessions have taken place and the existing
state is rendered extinct.

207. S.C. Res. 1022, Immediate Suspension of Sanctions on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro), U.N. SCOR, 3595th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1022 (Nov. 22, 1995).
208. G.A. Res. 47/1, Recommendation of the Security Council, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/, ¶ 1 (Sept. 22, 1992).
209. These political concerns essentially related to the alleged advantage that the SFRY
would obtain if it could in any way characterize the Yugoslav conflict as a civil war. See
CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 709, 714; Craven, 'The European Community Arbitration, supra
note 194, at 354–55.
210. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 707.
211. Id.; Paul R. Williams, State Succession and the International Financial Institutions:
Political Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q.
776 (1994).
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XV. IS DEVOLUTION SECESSION?
The etymology of “devolution” lies in the Latin term “devolvere”
212
This is mirrored in the Oxford English
meaning “to roll down.”
Dictionary which defines “devolution” as “[t]he passing of . . . power
[and] authority” and “[t]he causing of authority, duties, or the like to fall
213
upon a substitute or substitutes.” In the context of international law
and relations, the term is commonly used to describe a central
government’s voluntary grant of certain legislative powers to regional
214
or local government. The granting of legislative power is temporary
and can at any time be unilaterally withdrawn by the central
government, which still retains plenary legislative competence and
215
hence, sovereignty.
Unlike secession, a new state is not created. It
follows that devolution should not be included within the definition of
secession.
Noteworthy is that the meaning of “devolution” adopted above
conflicts with Crawford’s definition of the same concept, namely: “the
216
grant[ing] of independence by the previous sovereign.” The use of the
words “grant”, “independence” and “previous sovereign” indicate that
for Crawford, devolution connotes the creation of a new state over part
of the territory of an existing state with the latter’s consent.217 As
hitherto indicated such a turn of events is more correctly characterized
as constitutional or politically negotiated secession.
XVI. IS AUTONOMY SECESSION?
The etymology of “autonomy” lies in the Greek term “autonomos”
218
which means “to live by one’s own laws.”
The Oxford English
Dictionary correspondingly defines “autonomy” as the “right of self219
government, of making one’s own laws.” Scholarly definitions of
212. Devolve,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGY
DICTIONARY,
at
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?termsearch=devolve&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
213. 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 577–78 (2d ed. 1989).
214. During 1999, Britain’s Blair Government used devolutionary measures to create the
Scottish Parliament, National Assembly for Wales, and the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Devolutionary measures have also been used to create self-rule for Greenland (Denmark), the
Faroe Islands (Denmark), Aruba (The Netherlands),) and the Netherlands Antilles (The
Netherlands).
215. Stephen Young, Devolution in the United Kingdom: A Revolution on Online Legal
Research, LLRX (June 1, 2001) 1, http://www.llrx.com/authors/394.
216. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 330.
217. Id.
218. Autonomy,
ONLINE
ETYMOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?se arch=autonomy&searchmode=none (last visited Feb.
24, 2013); see also LAPIDOTH, supra note 14, at 29.
219. 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 575 (Clarendon Press, 1933).
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autonomy concur.
Lapidoth, for example, has suggested: “A territorial political
autonomy is an arrangement aimed at granting a group that differs from
the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the
majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its
220
distinct identity.”
Crawford has similarly written: “[A]utonomous
areas are regions of a State, usually possessing some ethnic or cultural
distinctiveness, which have been granted separate powers of internal
administration, to whatever degree, without being detached from the
221
State of which they are part.” Or as has been observed by Hannum
and Lillich: “Generally autonomy is understood to refer to
independence of action on the internal or domestic level, as foreign
affairs and defense normally are in the hands of the central or national
222
government . . . .”
It emerges from the foregoing that autonomous regions operate in
a manner akin to states. Unlike states, however, autonomous regions do
not enjoy sovereignty and hence standing in international law. This is
because they exist within states and their quasi-independent status can
often be revoked or modified by the central government, which still
223
retains plenary legislative competence. As autonomy does not result
in a grant of statehood, it is submitted that it should not be included
224
within the definition of secession.
XVII. A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL DEFINITION OF SECESSION
To recapitulate, in the context of international law and relations,
“secession” refers to: The withdrawal of territory (colonial or noncolonial) from part of an existing state to create a new state.
220. Lapidoth, supra note 14, at 33.
221. CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 323.
222. Hurst Hannum & Richard B Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 858, 860 (1980). Other scholars have provided similar definitions: Hans-Joachim
Heintze, On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy, in AUTONOMY: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS 7 (Markku Suksi ed., 1998); Savante E Cornell, Autonomy as a Source of Conflict:
Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective, 54 WORLD POL. 245, 249 (2002); Montserrat
Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global Age, 25 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1251, 1260 (2004); MICHAEL HECHTER, CONTAINING NATIONALISM 114 (2000); TIM POTIER,
CONFLICT IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH, ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA: A LEGAL APPRAISAL 54
(2001); Stefan Wolff and Marc Weller, Self-Determination and Autonomy: A Conceptual
Introduction, in AUTONOMY, SELF-GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIES 1, 13 (Marc Weller and Stefan
Wolff eds., 2005); Louis B Sohn, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law and the
Practice of the United Nations, 15 ISR. L. R. 180, 190 (1980).
223. This is confirmed by Heintze, who, when defining “autonomy” states “parts of the
state’s territory are authorized to govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and
statutes, but without constituting a state of their own.” Heintze, supra note 222, at 7.
224. Contra Von Hippel, supra note 148, at 186.
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To this prima facie definition, however, we may add the following
supplementary points:
First, secession is a process which leads to an outcome. The
outcome of secession is not defined in relation to the specific process by
which it is achieved.
Second, secession may occur according to two general processes:
consensual and unilateral. The former can be divided into constitutional
and politically negotiated secession.
Third, generally speaking, the process of secession ends and the
outcome occurs when the criteria for statehood based on effectiveness
are satisfied and no breaches of peremptory norms of international law
(jus cogens) can be identified during the putative secessionist state’s
formative process.
Fourth, recognition does not determine when the process of
secession ends and the outcome occurs because the declaratory
recognition theory, which provides that statehood antedates recognition,
is generally recognized as most closely representing lex lata vis-à-vis
international law. Accordingly, it is theoretically conceivable that the
outcome of secession may occur in the total absence of third state
recognition (however politically and practically important recognition in
such a context may be).
Fifth, the previous point is correct unless the total absence of third
state recognition is based upon breaches of peremptory norms of
international law (jus cogens) during the putative secessionist state’s
formative process. In such a case, the process of secession will be
ongoing, and the outcome will not have occurred. Generally, the
outcome will be unobtainable and the putative secessionist state will
languish as a stateless entity with the prospect of reabsorption by the
existing state.
Sixth, when secession occurs there is no need for a formal
declaration of independence from the (putative) secessionist state. This
rule is equally applicable in the context of a formal declaration of
independence antedating or coinciding with the outcome of secession.
Seventh, and finally, secession is distinguishable from:
i) Annexation, defined as the forcible incorporation, in whole
or part, of an existing state’s territory by another existing
state.
ii) Cession, defined as an existing state’s transfer of part of its
territory to another existing state, without regard for the
desires of the population within the transferring territory.
iii) Irredentism, defined as the amalgamation of an existing
state’s territory, in whole or part, with another existing
state.
iv) Dissolution, defined as the outcome of one or more
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secessions from an existing state, facilitating the latter’s
extinction.
v) Devolution, defined as the voluntary grant of certain
legislative powers to a lower level of government and
without a transfer of sovereignty.
vi) Autonomy, defined as the power of a sub-state region to
regulate its own affairs by enacting legal rules but without
a transfer of sovereignty.
Arriving at a justified definition of secession is critical in the
context of international law and relations as secession is a wellrecognised method of state creation. Rather than assuming (erroneously)
that there is a commonly accepted definition of secession, or
propounding an arbitrary definition devoid of justification, it is
incumbent upon scholars to invoke a more exacting approach. Indeed,
when we speak of secession as scholars, it is important to pause and
ask: “what are we talking about?”

